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In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi develops a critique of the nineteenth and 
twentieth liberal project to create a self-regulating market economy in terms of both its 
economic and political ramifications. This critique focuses first and foremost on his 
analysis of the dysfunction of the interwar gold standard, broken down in terms of its 
international and national articulations. Internationally, Polanyi conceived the gold standard 
as an institutional mechanism that created and extended the free market economic system 
across the globe. Politically, it constituted the anchor underpinning the Pax Britannica of 
the second half of the nineteenth century and, during a fleeting moment in the second half 
of the 1920s, the liberal Europe of Locarno. At the domestic level, the gold standard served 
as the policing agent of economic liberalism that went hand in hand with constitutional 
liberalism as the twin institutional foundations of the 19th century social order. 
Accordingly, the breakdown of the gold standard during the 1930s augured for Polanyi the 
destruction of this liberal European economic and political order. The emergence of 
explicitly anti-liberal political and economic regimes on the continent disrupted the 
international balance of power and set the stage for the conflagration of World War II. 
Thus, the breakdown of the interwar gold standard provided “the invisible link between the 
disintegration of [the] world economy since the turn of the century and the transformation 
of a whole civilization in the 1930s,” thereby underscoring the historic failure of “the 
utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system.”1 
From this perspective, it is impossible not to see the resemblances between the 
historical working and dysfunction of the interwar gold standard and those of contemporary 
European Monetary Union (EMU.) Like the gold standard, the latter is conceived as a 
                                                            
1 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time. reprint. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1957), 20, 29. 
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mechanism to create a self-regulating free market within Europe which underpins the 
economic and political organization of its member states. Similarly, like the gold standard 
before it, EMU is portrayed as the guarantee of post-Cold War stability and comity in 
Europe. Accordingly, like the dysfunction of the interwar gold standard, the dysfunction of 
EMU in the European sovereign debt crisis can be seen to pose a fundamental threat to the 
post-Cold War European economic and political order. The economic and social costs of 
this crisis, as well as the populist backlash against the neo-liberal policies enacted to 
resolve it, are beginning to threaten the self-regulating liberal market in Europe and by 
extension, the supranational and national division of economic and power presumed by the 
European Union (EU). 
The breakdown of the interwar liberal order as analyzed by Polanyi presents 
uncanny similarities, both in terms of its political economic dynamics and international and 
domestic articulations, to these developments. From this perspective, studying what 
happened in the 1930s may not only facilitate our understanding of the current European 
debt crisis, but also suggest the policies to be adopted—or not—by European and domestic 
political elites in order to avoid the mistakes which, in the midst of the Great Depression, 
precipitated the collapse of liberalism in Europe.2  
In this spirit, this paper proposes to analyze the similarities between the crisis of the 
1930s and that of today in Europe from the conceptual perspective developed by Polanyi in 
The Great Transformation. It does so at two analytical levels, by bringing to bear two 
distinct but related arguments. Internationally, the paper will focus on the inherent 
                                                            
2 Obviously, there are significant historical and contextual differences between the two periods—the horrors 
of WWII limiting the reappearance of fascism and notably Nazism on the continent, the much greater 
institutional solidity and normative legitimacy of democracy today compared to the 1930s, the acceptance by 
anti-establishment protest parties of the democratic rules of the game etc. Yet, these important caveats aside, 
both in terms of the current crisis’s cross-national and domestic political effects, the parallels between the 
1930s and today are simply too strong to be ignored or occluded. 
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contradictions and ensuing dysfunction of the interwar gold standard. It was the inherently 
deflationary bias of the latter, combined with its tendency to create and reinforce balance-
of-payments asymmetries among its members, which were, I shall argue, responsible for 
the outbreak and spread of the Great Depression. The proximate cause of the gold 
standard’s collapse was the succession of currency crises that were provoked by the social 
and political disruptions caused by its internal adjustment mechanism in order to rectify 
international balance of payments disequilibria. In turn, nationally, the paper examines how 
the terms of the gold standard’s operation affected the domestic economic and political 
fortunes of its member countries, leading either to the erosion or breakdown of their liberal 
economic and constitutional orders. Starting with the observation that markets are “socially 
embedded,”3 we introduce Polanyi’s argument regarding the “double movement” whereby 
the domestic economic and social implications of the self-regulated market produces 
sociopolitical forms of resistance that end up impeding its operation. Ultimately, it was this 
reaction against the market which, assuming historically ever more virulent forms, led to 
the overthrow of liberal democracy in 1930s Germany and the spread of political and 
economic illiberalism across Europe. This episode obviously carries striking resonances 
with the sociopolitical consequences of the European debt crisis across the Eurozone, 
particularly within its most indebted peripheral members. 
 This paper focuses specifically on the national cases of France and Germany in 
studying the gold standard’s internal workings and its domestic economic and political 
implications. Not only are these two states supremely illustrative of the balance of payment 
imbalances deflationary consequences that were inherent in the gold standard’s 
international and domestic operation, but their relative positions and the distinct roles they 
                                                            
3 Note on social embeddedness and its relationship to GS (GT 218) 
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played within the gold standard system present more than just a passing likeness to the two 
countries’ respective statuses within the contemporary Eurozone. Specifically, France and 
Germany have played reverse roles as either economic beneficiaries or ‘losers’ within the 
interwar gold standard or EMU. Consequently, they have experienced different political 
fortunes under each system and thus undergone varying policy trajectories as a result. 
France in 1930 was similar to Germany today in that it was—along with arguably the 
U.S.—the greatest beneficiary and most steadfast defender of the interwar gold standard. 
Indeed, as the strongest advocate of the “sound money” ideas that underpinned the interwar 
gold standard, it was the last major economy to abandon it in September 1936. Conversely, 
Germany in 1930 was similar to France today in that it stood as a relative ‘loser’ from and 
earliest doubter of the efficacy of the gold standard and the sound money philosophy 
undergirding it. Effectively the first major industrial economy to go off gold in July 1931, it 
also went furthest under the auspices of the new Nazi regime in overturning the economic 
policies that were associated with the gold standard and in repudiating the neoclassical 
liberal ideas that underlay it. Accordingly, as the rise of the Nazis attests, the gold 
standard’s domestic effects would also have feedback impacts on international governance 
in the 1930s. Thus we hope to tease out the implications that the collapse of interwar gold 
standard into depression and war could have for our understanding of the present-day crisis 
in Europe, and the institutional and policy remedies that might be pursued to resolve it.  
 
The Workings of the Interwar Gold Standard 
The classical gold standard system that had emerged in the 1870s had been a commodity-
based monetary system that provided for an automatic mechanism for controlling the 
money supply based on the gold peg, through the inflow and outflow of reserves as a 
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function of the balance of payments. In order to provide greater flexibility to this fixed 
exchange rate regime, during the interwar period gold reserves were supplemented by 
reserve currencies in the form of the pound sterling and the US dollar—making it in effect a 
gold exchange standard. As we shall see, this innovation would be as much a source of 
disruption as of stability within the system, and for both reserve currency countries—the 
UK and US—as well as for its other members.  
 Bearing this in mind, the failure of the interwar gold exchange standard was 
attributable to both economic and political factors. First, economically, it stemmed from the 
inherent balance of payment asymmetries that the system’s operation presumed. This in 
turn made it insupportably deflationary within the deficitary countries, particularly 
following the onset of recession beginning in the late 1920s when the requisite adoption of 
deflationary policies to right these imbalances effectively drove the latter into depression. 
As Polanyi observed, “[W]hat the laws of the market could not force upon reluctant wage 
earners, the foreign exchange mechanism effectively performed.” Thus, “the gold standard 
meant danger of deadly deflation and [] of fatal monetary stringency in a panic.”4 
 In turn, politically, the effects of deflation-induced depression eventually provoked 
a sociopolitical backlash in the gold standard countries—a backlash which came earlier in 
some, later in others—that in turn made the perpetuation of the deflationary policies it 
required democratically unsustainable within them. This in effect testified to the Polanyian 
“double movement” whereby the attempt to create a self-regulating market economy, 
underpinned by the automatic monetary mechanism of the gold standard, provoked the 
spontaneous upsurge of forces of social and political resistance against its operation—
resistance which ultimately, particularly under the auspices of democratic regimes, led to its 
                                                            
4 Ibid., 230, 138. 
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abandonment. Thus, “society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating 
market system” underpinned by gold.5 
 In this first part of the paper, we trace the emergence of the economic imbalances 
and dysfunctions that would ultimate condemn the interwar gold standard to failure. After 
setting out its intellectual foundations, we analyze the factors behind these balance of 
payments asymmetries that would come to plague the system. In turn, we examine how the 
deflationary bias that was built into the system as a consequence of these asymmetries 
ended up translating into the global credit crunch that started in the run-up to the 1929 stock 
market crash and produced the worst global depression in history. In turn, in the second 
part, we examine the political ramifications of the adoption and defense of the gold 
exchange standard, and then go on to consider what these came to mean at the level of 
international governance.  
In both instances, we will analyze these developments in respect to the national 
experiences of interwar France and Germany, first at the international level by identifying 
their respective positions within the gold standard system, then at the domestic level by 
assessing the sociopolitical implications of its operation. Finally, throughout this analysis 
we will compare the operation, dysfunction and eventual breakdown of the gold standard 
and its political ramifications to the present dysfunction of the European single currency 
area as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis, and its own economic and political 
fallout. 
 
As we saw, the gold standard was the principal international mechanism underpinning the 
operation of the prewar and interwar economies. As such, it was essential that it enshrine 
                                                            
5 Ibid., 76. 
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certain key ideas that were held by the dominant economic and political elites within its 
member countries. The primordial idea animating (neo)classical economists since Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo has been the idea—qualified as ‘utopian’ by Polanyi—of creating 
a self-regulating market economy encompassing labor, capital and land in order to resolve 
the problem of economic scarcity or poverty in the world. Under this conception, the gold 
standard was to serve as the core institutional mechanism by which international trade and 
capital exchanges would optimally unfold as a function of the automatic adjustment in 
national money supplies that in turn were to reflect movements of gold and reserve 
currencies in keeping with national payment imbalances. According to this mechanism, 
deficitary countries, by experiencing a decline in their money supplies as a result of the 
outflow of gold and reserves, would import less relative to exports, thereby closing the 
balance of payments deficit. Conversely, surplus countries, by experiencing an increase in 
the money supply as a result of the influx of gold, would import more relative to exports, 
thus reducing their balance of payments surplus. 
 In turn, due to its imputed preservation of open exchanges and the consequent 
maximization of prosperity among its members, the gold standard was seen as a vital 
institutional precondition for a liberal political order, both in its international and domestic 
incarnations. In a concrete rendition of Kantian liberal peace theory, the prewar Concert of 
Europe and interwar League of Nations which had institutionally enshrined the 
international balance of power relied on the stabilizing peace interest that transnational 
economic and financial actors had in maintaining the gold standard as a basis for preserving 
the European peace.6 The regular meetings of Europe’s (and America’s) chief diplomats 
through the interwar period was reflected in a succession of international conferences that 
                                                            
6 Ibid., 15-18. 
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sought to achieve the international political preconditions for preserving stable international 
currency exchanges. As Polanyi noted, for Europe’s pre- and postwar liberal elites “the 
gold standard had been the symbol of world solidarity.”7  
Similarly, domestically, the adhesion to gold as the precondition of the liberal 
market economy was seen to be the essential basis for a liberal constitutional and ultimately 
democratic political order. Thus evolved a quasi-theological belief in the gold standard, 
which came to be portrayed by its advocates as “one of the pillars of a free society, like 
property rights or habeas corpus, which had evolved in the Western liberal world to limit 
the power of government.”8 In short, belief in the convertibility to gold was the default 
economic idea across the globe both before and after World War I, which united politically 
and ideologically disparate countries, parties and social constituencies. As Polanyi put it:  
“Belief in the gold standard was the faith of the age. With some it was a naïve, 
with some a critical, with others a satanic creed implying acceptance in the 
flesh and rejection in the spirit. Yet the belief was the same, namely, that bank 
notes have value because they represent gold… the one and only tenet common 
to men of all nations and all classes, religious denominations and social 
philosophies. It was the invisible reality to which the will to live could cling, 
when mankind braced itself to the task of restoring its crumbling existence.”9 
 
Correlatively, the ideological power of the gold standard and the ‘sound’ or ‘hard money’ 
ideas which underlay it help to explain longstanding elite and popular resistance to 
jettisoning it in favor of a national currency and monetary independence through the 
interwar ear, despite its increasingly obvious economic and social costs. To once again 
quote Polanyi:  
“The 1920’s saw the prestige of economic liberalism at its height… 
Stabilization of currencies became the focal point in political thought of peoples 
and governments; the restoration of the gold standard became the supreme aim 
                                                            
7 Ibid., 26. 
8 Liaquat Ahamed, Lords of Finance: The Bankers who Broke the World (New York: Penguin, 2009), 169. 
9 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 25. 
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of all organized effort in the economic field. The repayment of foreign loans 
and the return to stable currencies were recognized as the touchstones of 
rationality in politics; and no private suffering, no infringement of sovereignty, 
was deemed too great a sacrifice for the recovery of monetary integrity.”10 
 
In short, the obdurate, even blind philosophical obedience to the orthodox economic 
tenets undergirding the gold standard would be one of the principal reasons for why 
countries failed to implement the adequate policies to pull themselves out of the interwar 
recession that had manifested itself in Germany and the commodity producing countries 
beginning in 1928. Instead, belying the grip the commitment to gold held over their 
national elites and publics, they persevered in pursuing the deflationary policies that were 
exiged by the gold peg, collectively plunging them into the Great Depression. In turn, it 
would only be in the mid-1930s, as evidence of growth in countries that had gone off gold 
became incontrovertible, that the sound money ideas underpinning the gold standard began 
to lose their intellectual and policy ascendancy among the governing elites, and that 
counter-cyclical policy alternatives were attempted in order to overcome the Depression.11 
It remains to explain how, in practice, the operation and defense of the interwar gold 
standard produced this dire result. For this we need to look first at the natural tendency 
toward imbalance or asymmetry that was displayed by the system, aggravated by the 
destabilizing economic and political conditions inherited from the war. In turn, we need to 
examine how the deflationary effect of the gold standard’s operation in deficitary countries 
precluded their being able to pull themselves out of recession or depression by effectively 
precluding them from employing the requisite counter-cyclical policies to do so. From this 
perspective then, as Barry Eichengreen has noted, the interwar gold standard acted as a 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 142. 
11 Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 348. 
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means of global transmission and amplification for the Great Depression during the 
1930s.12  
At base, the balance of payments asymmetries that came to characterize the operation 
of the gold standard flowed from the price differentials between the member countries, 
which in turn reflected the variable production costs distinguishing them. Thus, though the 
effects of the balance of payments on the money supply were supposed to make states more 
competitive over the long term, their different productive capacities endured as a function 
of their distinct positions in global supply chains, sectoral differences between early and 
late entrants into various export sectors, and shifting global consumer preferences.13 In 
effect, price differentials were likely to remain ensconced within the gold standard between 
primarily importing and exporting countries. Thus, as in the case of the Eurozone today, 
balance of payment asymmetries between core and periphery countries tended to endure 
rather than to resorb themselves. 
At the same time, a number of factors inherited from World War I tended to 
accentuate and exacerbate these asymmetries linked to the operation of the gold standard. 
First among these were the costs associated with the war, which transformed the pattern of 
the global balance of payments. Principally, the war strengthened the balance of payments 
position of the US and weakened that of the other nations, the reparations and war debt 
regime that came out of it ensuring a flow of gold out of Europe to the US. By the end of 
the war, sixteen Allied powers owed the US around $12 billion, of which a little less than 
$5 billion was due from Britain and $4 billion from France.14 In turn, as a result of the 
                                                            
12 Ibid., xi. 
13 C.f. Peter Gourevitch, “Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the 
Depression of the 1930s.” International Organization 38(1)(1984), pp. 95-129. 
14 Ahamed, Lords of Finance, 130-31. 
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attribution of total responsibility for the war at Versailles, Germany was imposed a 
reparations claim of 132 billion gold marks ($31 billion) by the Reparations Commission. 
American insistence on the reimbursement of the war debts incurred by its allies ensured 
that France and Britain would seek reparations from Germany so they could use them to 
reimburse those debts. This not only served to stoke German revanchisme—not to mention 
anti-American resentment on the part of the Allies themselves who had borne the brunt of 
the fighting in terms of blood and treasure15—but it also served to widen the global balance 
of payment asymmetries following from the war. Thus, through the 1920s, the external 
accounts of the deficitary states were balanced by capital outflows from the US to Europe. 
However, as US private capital investment in Europe began to dry up in the late 1920s, this 
placed growing balance of payments pressures on these countries as reserve outflows 
gained momentum. 
This introduced a second important factor in the workings of the interwar gold 
standard: the potentially destabilizing role of finance in its operation. Initially, the latter 
was seen as a compensatory agent of stability within the system with a vital disciplinary 
role to play in policing the finances of its participating states.16 However, financial flows, 
particularly in the form of short-term liabilities—so-called “hot money”—came to have an 
increasingly destabilizing impact on the interwar monetary system by exacerbating the 
balance of payments deficits of the deficitary countries, ultimately triggering balance of 
payments crises within them. As investors and speculators began to doubt a sovereign’s 
capacity to maintain its currency peg to gold, foreign exchange streamed out towards ‘safe’ 
                                                            
15 Hence the increasing disparaging reference to the US as “Uncle Shylock” in the French and British press, 
and the growth of anti-Americanism among  the publics of both countries throughout the 1920s. See Ibid., 
144. 
16 As Polanyi noted, bankers were “the professional guardians” of the gold standard and “the stable exchanges 
and sound credit conditions” with which it was held to be synonymous. Great Transformation, 199. 
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sovereigns—i.e. those with the greatest gold reserves—with the effect of eventually driving 
the country to default unless it received external loan assistance or was allowed to 
restructure its debt. Short of imposing capital controls and going off gold, such countries 
were thus forced to raise interest rates to prohibitive levels in order to staunch the capital 
outflows, further depressing domestic production while increasing their debt servicing 
costs. 
Thirdly, domestic sociopolitical and institutional developments within the belligerent 
countries also interfered with the function of the interwar gold standard and rendered it less 
stable than its prewar predecessor. The enfranchisement of workers and consequent rise of 
labor parties as well as the new strength of trade unions forced postwar governments to 
accept the permanence of wage and labor condition concessions that had been made to 
workers during the war in order to secure their backing for the war effort.17 These 
concessions, in conjunction with the growing politicization of the unemployment issue as a 
result of the intrusion of organized labor and workers’ parties into the democratic arena, 
tended to have inflationary effects. Likewise, they also raised deeper distributional conflicts 
that had been largely absent during the postwar era over which social segments should bear 
the costs of the war and the burden of restoring the balance of payments equilibrium under 
the operation of the gold standard. 
Finally, the institutional innovations presented by the interwar gold standard 
compared to the classical gold standard—notably the acceptation of the US dollar and 
pound sterling as reserve currencies that could be traded by central banks as a substitute for 
gold—also became a factor of instability in its operation. Officially established in order to 
provide more flexibility to the interwar gold standard by seeking to reduce its deflationary 
                                                            
17 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 30 et seq. 
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bias, in fact the bestowing of reserve status to the dollar and the pound would end up doing 
the opposite. Notably, it ended up reinforcing the balance of payments asymmetries and 
hence deflationary effects of the gold standard in two ways. First, by conferring the right of 
seniorage on the US and UK, the latter could simply print their currencies in order to fulfill 
their balance of payment obligations and these consequently had to be accepted by other 
gold standard members as reserves. In order to counter the inflationary effects of absorbing 
such reserves, a key concern for countries suffering from excessive inflation in the 1920s, 
the latter needed to implement deflationary policies that ended up stifling their economic 
performance.18 From this standpoint, the act of providing liquidity to the system by issuing 
greater quantities of the reserve currency became a factor of systemic instability that 
increased rather than decreased gold reserve asymmetries.  
Secondly, especially as the reserve currency countries themselves began to 
experience balance of payment pressures and to ship their currencies abroad in order to 
fulfill their payment obligations in the early 1930s, surplus countries began to exchange 
their dollar and pound reserves for gold, thereby exacerbating balance of payment 
imbalances in the UK and US as they hemorrhaged gold so as to buy back their currencies. 
Meanwhile, the substitution of gold for currency reserves did little to grow the money 
supplies of the surplus countries, thereby dampening the reflationary effect and preventing 
them from picking up slackening demand in the global economy. In short, the issuing of 
reserve currencies by the countries at the core of the interwar gold exchange standard in 
order to increase global liquidity ended up eroding the credibility of the dollar and pound 
gold peg, thereby heralding the potential collapse of the system.19 
                                                            
18 Ibid., ??? 
19 Fn on Triffin dilemma. 
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In short, a host of factors emerged that threatened the credibility of the peg to gold 
under the interwar gold exchange standard that had been largely absent under its prewar 
predecessor, and which would ultimately make it much more difficult to sustain. First and 
foremost, what was needed was heightened international cooperation to smooth the 
system’s function. However, due to an admixture of domestic sectoral conflicts and their 
political repercussions, international disputes over reparations and war debts, and 
incompatible conceptual frameworks regarding the gold standard’s operation, the requisite 
degree of cooperation would not be forthcoming. Instead, as Eichengreen has pointed out, 
the persistent “asymmetry in the gold standard system [allowed] countries in surplus [to] 
shift the burden of adjustment to countries in deficit” with domestic and international 
economic and political consequences that would ultimately render the gold standard 
unsustainable.20 As a result, the interwar gold standard would last barely more than a 
decade. In that time, however, it would presided over the onset of the worst economic 
slump in history. 
The second major factor that made the interwar gold standard inherently unstable and, 
as the last point attests, ultimately unsustainable was the inherent deflationary bias that was 
built into it. At one level, the problem was structural because, as Polanyi pointed out, the 
gold standard has an inherently contractionary bias on account of being based on a perforce 
limited supply of gold. If global trade and demand rose faster than the global money supply 
as pegged to gold, then interest rates would need to rise and investment to fall, thereby 
leading to a global decline in income. Conversely, the strictures on the money supply 
                                                            
20 Golden Fetters, 15. 
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imposed by limited gold reserves meant that an increase in production and trade that was 
unaccompanied by an increase in gold would cause prices to fall.21 
Yet, the deflationary bias inherent in the gold standard also reflected the ideological 
and psychological interest in the idea of “sound money” by which it was legitimated and 
rationalized. From this standpoint, austerity, or “the policy of cutting the state’s budget to 
promote growth,” was seen as a boon to business confidence.22 Deflation is construed as a 
means of “purg[ing] the rottenness out of the [economic] system” to use US Treasury 
Secretary Andrew Mellon’s famous phrase in reaction to the 1929 financial crash, and thus 
of increasing overall economic efficiency by eliminating excess wage demand and asset 
speculation, leading to a fall in production and investment costs.23 By signaling that it will 
allow such a purging process to unfold by cutting budgetary spending and raising taxes, 
deflation advocates argue, the government restores business investment and supply-side 
spending while simultaneously reducing the budget deficit. These ideas were put to the test 
in the 1930s by political and monetary authorities in the US and across Europe, attesting to 
the ubiquity of “sound money” principles among the elites in change of running their 
respective economies. 
 The problem with such deflationary policy, of course, was that, instead of 
“purg[ing] the rottenness out the system,” it ended up bleeding it dry. This could be seen at 
both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, the internally deflationary impact 
of the gold standard meant that production costs needed to fall in proportion to prices, 
which meant lower wages for workers and/or increased layoffs. In this sense, as Polanyi 
                                                            
21 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 193, and M. Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 182. 
22 Blyth, Austerity, 2. 
23 Quoted in Ahamed, Lords of Finance, 364. 
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noted, maintaining the gold parity became a key instrument of wage compression and hence 
of keeping production costs under control; it was a “hugely effectively arm of the lever that 
was pressing on the wage level… What the laws of the market often could not force upon 
reluctant wage earners, the foreign exchange level most effectively performed.”24 Secondly, 
budget cuts and tax increases, particularly when implemented in a depressionary 
environment, ended up reducing consumer demand, thereby stunting growth and fueling 
further unemployment. Correlatively, the shrinking of the money supply as a result of 
balance of payment deficits ended up stifling investment demand due to the rise in interest 
rates, similarly contributing to economic contraction and growing unemployment.25 In 
short, rather than reducing the public debt and consequent balance of payment deficits, the 
fall of aggregate demand due to deflationary fiscal and monetary policies ended up in fact 
worsening the debt as domestic tax receipts fell due to falling national incomes and rising 
unemployment. 
In turn, internationally, as domestic demand everywhere fell, global growth declined. 
States in deficit increasingly resorted to protectionist measures in order to complement their 
deflationary policies so as to reduce their balance of payment deficits, stifling global trade 
by choking export demand.26 Meanwhile, surplus states, rather than encouraging domestic 
growth through monetary reflation and fiscal spending, hunkered down and sought to 
weather the storm by economizing their surpluses and exchanging their currency reserves 
for gold. In short, due to the ubiquitous “sound money” ideas that underpinned the gold 
standard, no country emerged that either could nor would provide the source of global 
                                                            
24 Great Transformation, 230. 
25 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 15. 
26 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939. rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986), 123-30. 
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demand to pull the world economy out of the Depression. Hence, by adopting what 
appeared to be prudent and virtuous macroeconomic policies from the standpoint of their 
domestic economies, the surplus countries—notably the US and France in 1931, and then 
France after 1933—ended up deepening and prolonging the depressionary effects that were 
being transmitted across the globe through the mechanism of the gold standard.  
In this sense, these countries could be seen to be playing a similar role to 
contemporary Germany in its handling of the European sovereign debt crisis. The refusal of 
the latter to use its surplus to provide greater liquidity and demand within the Eurozone in 
order to help pull the deficitary peripheral economies out of recession is central to 
understanding the duration of the crisis and to account for the EU’s persistent failure to 
resolve it. 
These considerations beg the question of the broader parallels that might be found 
between the operation of the interwar gold standard and the contemporary Eurozone. At a 
first, intellectual level, we see the same, quasi-theological faith expressed in many quarters 
in the euro as was formerly placed in gold by interwar European publics and elites. As in 
the case of the gold standard, in present day Europe membership in the euro is viewed as 
the sine qua non of continued financial viability despite, the great economic and social 
costs attaching to remaining within it, particularly within the deflationary countries. 
Likewise, as with the gold standard, EMU is also seen as a guarantee of the European 
project’s supranational viability—the collapse of the euro being widely equated with the 
end of the European project as a whole—while it is broadly viewed by European political 
elites and governing parties as the key not just to member states’ economic prosperity, but 
their democratic identity as well. Likewise, the philosophical onus placed on “sound 
money” that was equated with fiscal and financial rectitude by interwar elites and monetary 
19 
 
authorities, is broadly replicated in the “ordo-liberal” paradigm focused on maintaining 
price stability and balanced budgets that impelled the Bundesbank in the run up to EMU 
and, since 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB). The continuing salience of these ideas 
within the European Commission, the ECB, and the European Council, reflecting in turn 
the growing clout wielded by Germany as Europe’s largest economy, is to be seen as one of 
the principal reasons for the Eurozone’s failure to extirpate itself from the current crisis.27 
In turn, in terms of its internal functioning, the euro has also generated widening 
balance of payment asymmetries among its member states, notably between its core export 
economies, led by Germany, and its peripheral importers, i.e. the PIIGS.28 At first blush, as 
in the case of the gold standard this asymmetry reflects divergent production costs between 
the surplus countries, for whom the euro made their exports relatively cheaper 
internationally than under their national currencies, and the deficit countries, for whom the 
“strong” euro peg made their exports relatively more expensive than under their previous 
national currencies.29 Under such a dispensation, the only way that the deficitary countries 
could balance their national payments was through capital inflows from banks in the core 
countries that were looking to reap greater returns on the higher interest rates obtaining in 
the former after EMU was completed and interest rates across the Eurozone converged. The 
sovereign debt crisis broke out when the ability of the peripheral countries to service this 
debt was put into doubt following the revelation in October 2009 that Greece had falsified 
its public finance statistics, spurring investors to pull out their money in mass from the 
PIIGS and plunging them into a balance-of-payments crisis. In turn, as foreign investors 
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28 This unfortunate—and one suspects, not accidental—acronym stands for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece 
and Spain. 
29 Ibid., 77. 
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increasingly doubted or bet against their ability to reimburse their euro denominated 
sovereign debt, they were forced to raise the interest rate on the latter, which caused their 
debt burdens to dramatically grow despite their pursuit of austerity policies to curb public 
spending.30 
Yet, it worth remembering that, as a number of observers have pointed out, the 
surplus countries needed the peripheral countries to purchase exports which their own 
publics failed to buy at home.31 Likewise, banks in the core made hefty profits from 
borrowing money at low rates of interest at home and then lending it back at high rates in 
the PIIGS.32 Thus, as under the 1930s gold standard, finance also played a stabilizing and 
then destabilizing role within the Eurozone as a volatile yet compensatory agent for 
productivity-based current account asymmetries among its members. 
Finally, just as the gold standard’s operation was inherently deflationary, so has the 
Eurozone’s proven to be under the succession of rules dictating the terms of convergence 
among EMU members in 1999—the Maastricht criteria—and in turn, the fiscal 
constraints—under the aegis of the Stability and Growth Pact (1999) and since 2012, the 
Fiscal Compact—agreed by its member states to limit budgetary spending as a way of 
maintaining price stability and limiting the members states’ balance of payments 
disequilibria. Hence, the successively stringent rounds of austerity imposed on the PIIGS 
by the ‘Troika’—the ECB, European Commission and International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF)—in response to the sovereign debt crisis in late 2009, early 2010. In keeping with 
the “sound money” template that animated budget slashers in the gold standard states 
during the 1930s, European “ordo-liberals” are also seeking to “purge the rottenness out of 
the system” in order to provide the Eurozone with a business-confidence spurred supply 
shock. Such is their rationale for slashing budgets and cutting benefits in the middle of a 
recession. 
In short, both in terms of its intellectual foundations and operational effects, the 
likenesses between the present-day Eurozone and its travails and the interwar gold standard 
are strong enough to bring one observer to remark that, provided “one swap the injunction 
of maintaining the ‘convertibility to gold’ for the ‘integrity of the euro,’” the Eurozone and 
the gold standard are essentially “the same system.”33 Indeed, the former may be even more 
constrictive than the latter since, whereas a currency pegged to gold offers the ultimate 
recourse to devaluation in order to resolve a balance of payments crisis, Eurozone members 
lack this alternative since they have abandoned their national currency in joining the euro. 
Thus, short of defaulting on their payment obligations, the sole option open to deficitary 
states under the present system is to balance their budgets through ever greater deflation, 
thereby adding an “extra layer of bondage to what is effectively a gold standard without 
gold.”34 
 
The Politics of Stabilization in France and Germany 
These general considerations regarding the foundations and operation of the interwar gold 
standard lead us to compare the respective positions and experiences of France and 
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Germany within it. It is worth recalling in this respect how the different factors—
intellectual, financial, social and political—which had a bearing on the (dys)function of the 
interwar gold standard respectively affected these two countries during the 1920s and 
1930s. 
 First of all, France and Germany came out of World War I in very different 
financial places, placing them at antithetical positions within the interwar monetary system 
in terms of their balance of payments situation and the policy responses they adopted in 
consequence. First and foremost, this difference was a function of their differential status as 
respective victors and losers in the war and was reflected financially in the reparations 
burden that was imposed on Germany, a substantial part of which was to go to France. As 
we saw, in 1921 the Reparations Committee commissioned by the Versailles Treaty to levy 
reparations against Germany imposed a total reparations sum of $132 billion gold marks on 
the country. Service on the first tranche of 50 billion marks was to begin immediately in 
1921, amounting to a sum of 4 billion marks that represented fully 10% of national 
income.35 Meanwhile, France had incurred $4 billion of war debts from the US and owed a 
further $3 billion to Britain, for a total of $7 billion.36 The insistence of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and the US banking interests it represented that war debts be paid 
ensured that Britain and particularly France would seek to exact reparations payments from 
Germany so as to be able to service its debt obligations to the US. Thus, from the start a 
fundamental balance of payment asymmetry was programmed into the system, with the US 
essentially serving as creditor to the world in the immediate postwar period. 
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 A further complication was the transformation of the political and institutional 
landscapes in both countries. This change was most evident in Germany, where a liberal 
democratic constitutional regime, the Weimar Republic, had replaced the defeated 
Wilhelmine monarchy. This new democratic dispensation saw the enfranchisement of 
parties representing workers, such as the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which 
had been outlawed from 1878 to 1880 in the prewar Reich, and the nascent German 
Communist Party (KPD) which had been formed around the Spartacist movement of Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and a majority of Independent Socialists in the wake of 
the Bolshevik Revolution.37 At the same time, the war and postwar regime saw the 
empowerment of labor organizations and trade unions, who often worked hand in hand with 
these parties. In exchange for securing labor’s acquiescence and support for the war effort 
from 1914 to 1918, the wartime government approved numerous concessions to workers 
regarding their wage and work conditions. Most notably, these included the provision of the 
eight hour day and the granting of worker bargaining rights within the workplace.38 The 
end of hostilities raised the question of whether these concessions would carry over in the 
postwar era as well as the broader issue of who would bear the fiscal burden of servicing 
Germany’s heavy reparations bill.39 
 Similar concessions to labor were also evident in France, though a democratic 
regime had been in place there since 1870. The Section Française de l’Internationale 
Ouvrière (SFIO), the French socialist party, had seen its political stature rise as a result in 
its participation in the unity government—the Union Sacrée—that had steered the country 
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through the war. Likewise, the war had strengthened trade unions—notably the 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)—as key partners in the war effort and allowed 
them to secure substantial concessions in return: the granting of collective bargaining rights 
to industry as a whole in March 1919 (though this would not be enforced until the 1930s) 
and the extension of the eight hour day to all firms in April.40 Likewise, as in Germany, 
fiscal issues—and their distributional impacts—grew in importance as the question of who 
would pay for reconstruction and the war came to the fore. These questions were only 
amplified by the expansion of social spending in both countries—and more broadly across 
the industrialized world—in order to stem the appeal of Bolshevism among industrial 
workers in 1919 and 1920.41 
 In turn, the empowerment of workers and working class parties as a result of World 
War I as well as the growth of social spending in both countries in the immediate postwar 
period precipitated a reflationary boom that brought the issue of inflation to the fore of 
economic and political debate. In France (as well as the US and Britain), budgets were 
constricted once the revolutionary threat was thought to have passed, giving way to the 
recession of 1920-1921. Meanwhile, in Germany, inflation continued apace as a result of 
political gridlock over reparations, culminating in the hyperinflationary crisis of 1922-1923. 
 The issue of inflation in both countries—and at least in France, subsequent 
deflation—brought to the fore core distributional issues that would plague the politics of 
the 1920s. Domestically, inflation hurt creditors and savers (rentiers), shopkeepers and 
independent producers and white collar middle class groups while benefiting large firms 
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and export businesses and workers affiliated with the latter. Conversely, deflation hurt 
debtholders, large firms and exporters, taxpayers and groups whose wages were indexed to 
prices, while benefiting import-competing firms and their workers, middle class savers and 
people on fixed incomes. Such distributive conflicts linked to inflation—and conversely, 
deflation—would become key mobilizing issues during the interwar period in both France 
and Germany, contributing to the variable political outcomes within them.42 
 Internationally, the issue of inflation raised balance of payments questions due to 
the discrepancy in prices between states. It became a source of global financial instability 
as a result of widening balance of payment asymmetries due to the absence of a common 
store of value to anchor the global monetary system as had existed under the classical gold 
standard. In turn, inflation fed the debate surrounding currency stabilization—namely over 
the level at which to peg the currency to gold. This question bore on the distributional 
conflicts raised above in both their monetary and fiscal dimensions. The level of 
stabilization, i.e. value of the currency peg and its determination of nominal domestic 
prices, would have the practical effect of relatively favoring either the sectoral or class 
winners of inflation or deflation. Similarly, the degree of fiscal adjustment required to 
maintain and defend the peg necessarily raised distributive conflicts related to tax and 
spending policies, and hence to the sectoral and class implications of their design.  
In both France and Germany, the capacity to maintain the peg to gold in the face of 
global financial turbulence would play a crucial role in mediating these distributional 
conflicts and hence, in shaping political outcomes in both countries. By the same token, the 
ideological convictions of policy makers, namely their commitment to the political and 
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policy ideals of “sound money” would also prove of paramount importance in both 
determining their commitment to convertibility in the face of turbulence or conversely, in 
facilitating the adoption of countercyclical policies in order to overcome the slump. In 
short, given its distributional and knock-on political effects, the decision of the level at 
which to peg the mark or the franc to gold was neither a straightforward nor costless one; it 
was bound to underlie future sectoral and class conflicts over economic policy as well as 
affect each country’s economic trajectory throughout the postwar period. Countries could 
either choose to restore the prewar peg (like the US which never went off gold, or the UK 
that readopted the prewar conversion rate of £14.50 per ounce of gold) or else they could 
opt for a devalued—i.e. more export competitive—peg. It is interesting to note that  
France and Germany chose contrary alternatives, France opting for a devalued franc 
compare to the prewar conversion rate, while Germany chose to peg at its prewar rate of 
exchange to the dollar. These contrary decisions reflected the different political and 
economic circumstances facing each country at the time it chose to restore convertibility to 
gold. In turn, their respective pegs to gold were instrumental in shaping the respective 
economic and political futures of both through the second half of the 1920s and into the 
1930s. 
In Germany, the decision over the level at which to stabilize the mark was 
inextricably tied to the reparations issue and the massive initial balance of payment deficit 
which they caused. The political debate surrounding this decision turned around two 
questions: 1.) whether Germany should make the effort to pay the reparations, the 
conciliatory position adopted by the SPD and centrist democratic parties, or instead resist 
repayment, the rejectionist position adopted by the nationalist right, and 2.) whatever 
payments were to be made, who should bear the greatest burden in servicing Germany’s 
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reparations debt. In the year following May 1921 when the Reparations Committee fixed 
the reparations total it was to pay, Germany delivered 75% of the reparations payments that 
were expected of it.43 However, its ability to continue servicing reparations depended on 
the government’s ability to legislate a tax increase in order to raise the requisite funds to 
meet its future obligations. Predictably, the Reichstag was unable to agree on such 
legislation because of the distributional conflicts involved in deciding what sectoral or class 
groups should bear the greatest burden of the tax. The fundamental disagreement emerged 
between the socialists and their allies, who advocated a levy on the wealthy in order to raise 
the requisite funding, and the center and right-wing parties who wished to do so through a 
value-added tax (VAT) increase.44 In turn, backing for raising taxes in order to service 
reparations was diluted by nationalist resistance to the transference of any tax proceeds 
abroad.45 The watered-down compromise bill that was finally agreed by the Reichstag in 
January 1922—and which was coaxed through following the Reparations Committee’s 
accession to a German demand that payments be reduced to 75% of those scheduled—
would not raise sufficient taxes to meet the contrary’s outstanding reparations 
commitments.  
Thus, the government was increasingly forced to print money in order to cover the 
budget deficits occasioned by reparation payments, thereby increasing the country’s overall 
balance of payments liabilities. Initially, these were covered through inflows of private 
foreign capital. However, once it became apparent that the Allies would not revise the 
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reparations total downward, these capital flows reversed course and left Germany, 
aggravating the country’s balance of payments deficit.46 This set the stage for the 
inflationary and then hyperinflationary spiral that would overtake the country in 1922-1923 
as the mark abruptly fell in response to these capital outflows. The situation was further 
worsened by the assassination of Walter Rathenau in June 1922 and then by the January 
1923 occupation of the Ruhr by French and Belgian troops in order to forcibly extract 
reparations payments from Germany. 
The incapacity of the Franco-Belgian occupation and German economic resistance 
to it to break the reparations deadlock led to a worsening of Germany’s budget deficit and 
the spiraling out of control of inflation.47 As capital fled the country and the mark 
depreciated, this led to a spike in nominal prices which was followed by a rise in wages. 
Inflation in turn eroded the value of tax receipts, thereby increasing the budgetary shortfall. 
Since the government was resorting to the printing press in order to pay its obligations, the 
resulting glut of money in circulation accelerated the (hyper)inflationary spiral, further 
depressing the real value of the mark and restarting the cycle anew.  
This monetization of the budget deficit, reflecting the fact that investors were 
eschewing German bonds as a means to pay for it, sent the mark tumbling to unheard of 
lows and prices careening to unprecedented heights. Between August and November 1923, 
the value of the US dollar exploded from 620,000 marks to 630 billion! Similarly, the 
prices of basic necessities reached absurd proportions: 250 billion marks for a kilo of 
butter; 180 billion for a kilo of bacon; a ride on the Berlin street car, which had cost 1 mark 
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before the war, was now priced at 15 billion. Even though mark notes were issued in 100 
billion denominations, people still required entire sheaves—transported in wheelbarrows, 
hampers or prams—in order to pay for the most elementary goods.48  
In short, it was the Weimar government’s failure to raise the taxes necessary to 
close the budget deficit linked to reparations, in turn leading to massive capital flight and 
the mark’s collapse, which triggered the inflationary spiral that reached hyperinflationary 
proportions when monetary authorities resorted to printing money in order to nominally 
cover the deficit.49 This failure underscored the fact that Germany, to use Eichengreen’s apt 
phrase, found itself locked in a “fiscal war of attrition” that was playing out at both the 
domestic—labor-capital debate—and international—Ruhr Occupation—levels.  
By November 1923, the costs of the latter had become too high for all sides. 
Hyperinflation had broken the relationship between export growth and inflation due to the 
rise in the price level and growing exchange rate uncertainty, thereby depriving German 
firms of investment as investors sought to place their money in “safe-currency” assets.50 
Conversely, France, under pressure from the other Allies and experiencing its own 
inflationary pressures linked to the monetizing of budget deficits to in part make up for the 
shortfall in German reparations payments, also grew eager to resolve the crisis.51 
Accordingly, the mark was stabilized in November 1923 under the stewardship of the new 
Reichsbank chief Hjalmar Schacht. The government revalued its reserves, pegged the 
exchange rate to the dollar (initially at 4.2 billion marks to the dollar) and stopped 
borrowing from the central bank to pay for the deficit. Through the pursuit of draconian 
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austerity measures, the budget deficit fell and inflation came to a halt. Correlatively, a 
revalued mark, the Rentenmark, was introduced which, pegged at 1 trillion old 
Reichsmarks, effectively put it at the prewar parity of 4.2 marks to the dollar.52 At the same 
time, German industrialists reversed their opposition to reparations and offered to negotiate 
with the Reparations Commission, resulting in the Dawes Plan of 1924, which put the 
reparations regime back on track in exchange for Franco-Belgian withdrawal from the 
Ruhr. For their part, the Allies—including the French—showed a new flexibility regarding 
the reparations issue, the Dawes Plan providing for a rescheduling of German reparations 
according to a more reasonable time frame. Germany’s debt burden was reduced from 
$12.5 billion for the first reparations tranche to between $8 and $10 billion, with the 
country obligated to pay $250 million in the first year (1924), a charge that would gradually 
rise to $600 million per year by the end of the decade.53 
Finally, in order to restore price stability, Schacht made the decision to peg the 
exchange rate of the new mark to gold at the prewar value of 4.2 marks to the dollar. To 
back the new peg, the Dawes Plan provided for a $25 million loan denominated in pounds 
sterling and a further $25 million in capital to be raised abroad by German banks. With this 
new capital, Germany hoped to raise $200 million in loans to help service its reparations 
payment for 1924 as well as augment its meagre gold reserves (which were valued at only 
around $100 million.)54 In short, the immediate objective of the Dawes Plan was to 
recapitalize the Reichsbank and sufficiently build up its gold reserves to be able to jump 
start the country’s economic recovery, thereby allowing it to fulfill its restructured 
reparations debt. 
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Initially, the Dawes Plan appeared to fulfill these optimistic expectations. The loans 
granted to Germany set in motion a rapid cycle of international—primarily American—
private lending to Germany that would translate into an asset-fueled boom in the country 
through the mid-1920s. Yet, despite this, the hyperinflationary episode of 1923 would end 
up having long-lasting political and policy implications in the country. According to 
Liaquat Ahamed, Germany had just “experienced the single greatest destruction of 
monetary value in human history,” ruining entire swathes of the population and eventuating 
“a revolutionary transformation of the German class structure.”55 Most notably, petits 
rentiers, middle class savers, and people living on fixed incomes or salaries (i.e. civil 
servants) had been devastated by the hyperinflation, which saw their holdings effectively 
transferred to the wealthy as well as industries and firms that possessed the financial 
wherewithal to speculate on the dramatic fall of real prices and exchange rates. In turn, this 
effective wiping out of their savings was legally enshrined in a July 1925 law which limited 
the revaluation on mortgages that saw their real worth destroyed in the hyperinflation 
limited to 25% of their real worth before June 15, 1922, and the revaluation of corporate 
bonds purchased from July 1, 1920 on by only between 10% and 25% of their purchase 
price.56 Understandably, these experiences converted those groups who suffered most from 
the hyperinflation to the virtues of “sound” money principles when it came to economic 
policy. These principles would serve to reinforce their commitment, and thereby condition 
their political choices, to maintain the gold peg in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the 
issue of devaluation emerged once again.  
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Conversely, inflation had benefited not only debtors—especially farmers—but also 
(at least before it spiraled out of control) dynamic, export oriented industries and their 
workers who saw international demand for their goods increase as inflation eroded the real 
value of the latter. In turn, it was firms in these sectors and their workers who took the lead 
in calling for an end to the policy of passive resistance against the Ruhr occupation when 
hyperinflation negated their ability to access global markets as the link between domestic 
costs and international prices was irrevocably cut. Finally, when it came to revaluation both 
labor and export industries argued for a ‘low’ peg of the mark to gold in order to maximize 
the international price competitiveness of their goods.57 
This opposition between creditors and debtors, import-competing and export 
businesses, functionaries and workers lay the sectoral basis for new political cleavages that 
emerged within the Weimar Republic during the 1920s. It was these cleavages that would 
slowly fracture the centrist DDP (German Democratic Party)/ DVP (German Popular 
Party)/SPD coalitions that would last through the mid-1920’s as the growing economic 
tensions between groups that had been previously united around the democratic center gave 
way to growing sectoral competition and antagonism, paving the way in turn for growing 
political polarization and fragmentation by the end of the decade. Thus, the issue of 
inflation and its differential impact would cast an omnipresent shadow over the continued 
viability of this coalition, particularly as the new gold peg came under strain and the social 
costs implied by its defense began to tell.  
More broadly, the restoration of the currency peg at the prewar level of 4.2 marks to 
the dollar portended future problems in another sense as well. Though perhaps symbolically 
edifying, it heralded the advent of an overpriced mark in the postwar period, particularly 
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given the emergence of new inflationary political institutions and mechanisms as a result of 
the war. Combined with the continued burden of reparations, this meant that Germany 
would have great difficulty in achieving a balance of payment equilibrium through the 
current account by enhancing its productivity and competitiveness. Instead, balance would 
have to be achieved—as it was from 1924 to 1928—through the capital account with a 
steady inflow of loans and capital investment in order to finance its permanent current 
account deficit, thus limiting the country’s capacity to accumulate reserves. (See Figure 1 
below.) 
Figure 1 
 
                             Source: Ahamed, Lords of Finance, 377. 
However, once this infusion of money dried up, particularly following the 1929 stock 
market crash, this would set the country up for a balance of payments crisis from which 
Weimar would never economically recover. In turn, the recourse to deflationary policies, 
imposed with the painful memories of 1923 still fresh in mind, would transform the 
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financial crisis into a deep depression that would ultimately sweep the republic away and 
augur the advent of the Nazi regime. 
 
In France, the debate over stabilization, though starting from a similar context, followed a 
different trajectory from Germany and produced a divergent outcome. As in Germany, 
concessions to labor during the “Union Sacrée” and the rise in political stature of the left 
combined with social spending increases to ward off the communist threat in 1919-1920 
also lay the basis for an inflationary spike in the postwar period. In turn, despite raising 
taxes in the summer of 1920 once the Bolshevik threat had passed,58 inflation remained a 
problem through the first half of the decade, largely as a result of the continuing 
reparations-war debt conundrum. Indeed, in the early 1920’s through the Ruhr Occupation, 
state budgets were predicated on receipt of German war reparations payments. When these 
failed to materialize, the actual deficit would rise and then be covered by printing money.59 
Thus, as a result of successively monetizing the deficit, inflation continued to rise in France 
and the franc began to slide against the dollar. Correlatively, reconstruction of the 
northeastern departments that suffered the greatest destruction in the war—and which under 
the terms of Versailles was also supposed to be paid for with reparations—ended up being 
largely self-financed. Coming at a cost of $4 billion, the costs of reconstruction also added 
to the national deficit. Accordingly, in the spring of 1924 prior to the finalization of the 
Dawes Plan, the franc fell to 25 against the dollar (versus the prewar value of five.)60 In 
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turn, by 1924 the cost of living had nearly doubled compared to 1918 and increased almost 
four fold since 1914.61 
 Following the Dawes agreement, France’s budget deficit appeared to stabilize, 
decreasing from approximately $1 billion (over 10% of GDP) in 1923 to under $50 million 
(less than 0.5% of GDP) at the beginning of 1925.62 This improvement reflected a 
combination of the government’s new realism regarding how much it hoped to recover on 
the one hand, and the passage of an across-the-board double décime (20%) tax by the Bloc 
National government in January 1924. In turn, the establishment in 1920 of a new currency 
ceiling of 41 billion francs on how much the government could borrow from the Bank of 
France was held to underscore the newfound financial rectitude of the French state. 
Accordingly, following the signing of the Dawes Plan in August 1924 through the spring of 
1925, the franc stabilized at between 18 and 19 to the dollar.63  
 The problem was that French public finances were in reality much more precarious 
than it appeared due to the short-term maturity of the overwhelming proportion of French 
government debt, regularly exposing the country to budgetary crises should this debt fail to 
be rolled over. The precariousness of the situation was underscored by the discovery in 
April 1924 that over the previous year the government had illicitly borrowed two billion 
francs—5% of the currency in circulation—from the Bank of France. The ensuing scandal 
precipitated the fall of the Herriot government in April 1925 and reawoke investor fears 
about the reliability of French finances.64 Despite measures taken by the new Painlevé 
government—and the conservative Radical finance minister Joseph Caillaux—to try to 
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balance the budget by raising taxes and restructuring the French war debt to Britain 
(reducing it from the equivalent of $3 billion to $1.2 billion), the failure to obtain a similar 
write-down on the $4 billion owed to the United States and the inability to negotiate a roll-
over by the Bank of France of French short-term debt obligations led to a continuing rise in 
prices and fall in the value of the franc as the government was forced to resume monetizing 
the deficit. Thus, in November 1925, just as Caillaux was being forced out as finance 
minister, the franc slipped down to 25 to the dollar.65 
 Over the following eight months, the country saw a succession of five finance 
ministers who each failed to balance the budget. Despite the conclusion of an agreement 
with the US that revalued the French war debt at 40 cents on the dollar in April 1926, the 
franc kept falling, reaching a new low of 30 to the dollar in May; meanwhile, the cost of 
living increased by two percent per month, equivalent to 25% a year. The slide continued 
into the summer, the franc reaching a new low of 37 in June and over 40 in July, falling to a 
nadir of 50 to the dollar on July 21 as a stream of money hemorrhaged out of the country. 66 
 Throughout this period, France witnessed the same sort of distributive sectoral and 
political conflicts over inflation and the level at which to stabilize the franc that had come 
to the fore in Germany—though with admittedly less catastrophic consequences—in the 
wake of the hyperinflation of 1923. Middle-class savers—the holders of government-
backed securities and individuals whose incomes depended upon liquid assets like 
pensions—, white collar workers who were insufficiently organized to push for wage-
indexation, and shopkeepers and artisans who needed to pay wholesalers in cash but 
extended credit to their customers, suffered the most from inflation and were vehemently 
                                                            
65 Ibid., 250-51. 
66 Ibid., 251, 254, 261-62. 
37 
 
opposed to devaluation of the franc.67 Meanwhile, big business—particularly in the trading 
sector—and those producers affiliated with it supported moderate inflation and devaluation 
since this allowed governments to pay off their bonds with devalued money, thereby 
reducing the need for raising corporate tax rates while lowering the real debt and tax 
obligations faced by business. At the same time, since organized labor was still not 
sufficiently strong to secure wage indexation, business’s real labor costs fell as well.68 
 In turn, politically, in a replay of the German “fiscal war of attrition” of the early 
1920s, the principal parties of the interwar Third Republic fought over who should bear the 
greatest burden in stabilizing the budget. The Socialists and left of the Radical Party within 
the Cartel des Gauches coalition that had obtained a parliamentary majority in the elections 
of 1924 sought to consolidate the budget through the introduction of a levy on capital. 
Conversely, the parties of the center right (Alliance Démocratique) and conservative right 
(Fédération Républicaine), along with conservative Radicals led by Joseph Caillaux, all of 
which were backed by powerful financial and business interests such as the Union des 
Intérêts Economiques and the Comité Mascuraud, supported placing the cost of adjustment 
on workers and consumers through across-the-board excise taxes.69 As a result of this 
fundamental political division, the Cartel government was unable to pass a budget for 1926 
and thus address the country’s economic and financial problems by instituting a coherent 
financial and tax policy. 
 In the face of mounting inflation, accelerating capital flight, and a collapsing franc, 
Raymond Poincaré was named premier at the end of July, effectively marking the end of 
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the Cartel des Gauches. After falling to a low of 50 to the dollar, upon his appointment the 
franc stabilized, climbing back to 35 over his first week in office.70 The key was that the 
stewards of the country’s monetary policy, the regents of the Bank of France, authorized 
Poincaré to do what it had categorically denied to preceding Cartel des Gauches 
governments, i.e. sell francs below the official 1914 rate, thus making it possible to restore 
the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves and thereby lessen the pressure on the 
franc. Combined with the creation of an amortization fund to allow it to pay back its debts 
and the passing of a new budget that reduced the deficit by levying new taxes, the Poincaré 
ministry was able to stabilize the franc at 25 to the dollar by the end of 1926, marking an 
80% reduction of its prewar value. It was at this level that it would be maintained before 
being officially pegged to gold in June 1928.71 
 In marked contrast to Germany, then, where the prewar gold parity was 
reestablished following the hyperinflation of 1923, in France the franc was at only 20% of 
its prewar value. Economically, this would make French goods extremely competitive on 
global markets, allowing the country to run up considerable balance of payments surpluses 
through the current account, and hence substantial reserves, during the second half of the 
1920s and early 1930s. (See Figure 1 above.) Consequently, France would be shielded from 
the full force of the slump that hit the US and other European countries following the crash 
of 1929, lending it an air of economic fortitude and resilience while other countries suffered 
under the Depression. 
 At the same time, however, the franc Poincaré would itself be the source of future 
international and domestic instability. France’s accumulation of a large balance of payment 
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surplus as a result of the devalued franc, particularly once Britain went off gold in 
September 1931, became a major source of deflationary asymmetry within the global 
economy that would make it near impossible for other countries to escape the Depression 
from within the gold standard. This was all the more true as the French, who would tightly 
cling to the “sound money” nostrums of monetary virtue and prudence, would refuse to 
inject liquidity into the system to dampen the bite of the Depression.  
In turn, domestically, the 80% devaluation of the franc implied by the new gold peg 
would prove extremely politically divisive. It came primarily at the expense of small savers 
and traditional middle class groups who saw their interests as having been betrayed in order 
to favor big business exporters and import competing firms and their workers. And since 
these middle class groups represented the principal electoral base of the political parties 
that constituted the parliamentary fulcrum of the Third Republic, the Radicals on the center 
left and Fédération Républicaine on the Right, when it came to finding agreement with 
other political actors who represented other key sectoral or class interests, such as the 
Alliance Démocratique which was close to big business or the Socialists who (along with 
the Communists) were close to the working class, it would become extremely difficult to 
agree on policy measures to rectify the country’s economic trajectory once it itself began to 
sink into depression starting in 1932.72 Indeed, after 1928, middle class savers and by 
extension, the parties that defended them, would become that much more committed to the 
ideals of “sound money” and the deflationary policies they implied once the Depression hit. 
Thus, the franc Poincaré sowed the seeds for future sectoral and political polarization 
around the formulation of economic policy as the Depression tightened its grip—a 
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polarization that would ultimately be enshrined in the political rupture represented by the 
victory of the Popular Front in May 1936. 
 The contest over stabilization that unfolded in Germany and France during the 
1920s, translating into a “strong” mark in the former and a “weak” franc in the latter, 
presents some interesting similarities with the present European single currency, both in 
terms of the current position of each country within the euro and the policy latitude 
imposed upon the latter by its operation. However, when the euro was introduced in 1999 
the currency roles of the two countries were reversed from what they had been under the 
interwar gold standard. Whereas in the 1920s Germany had pegged the mark to gold at a 
relatively ‘low’ (i.e. strong) level by readopting the prewar parity, in 1999 the new currency 
was comparatively “weaker” for Germany as a function of its domestic costs than the 
deutschmark had been. This was especially the case once the Agenda 2010 labor market 
and social insurance reforms came into effect beginning in 2003. Conversely, whereas the 
franc Poincaré had been introduced in France at a relatively high (i.e. weak) level compared 
to the prewar franc to gold parity, in 1999 the euro was quite strong in relation to the 
country’s domestic cost competitiveness. In consequence, the relative balance of payments 
positions cultivated by both countries within the Eurozone have been diametrically opposed 
to what their experience had been under the interwar gold standard. It was now France that 
was saddled with a current account deficit which it needed to finance through foreign 
lending. Meanwhile, it was Germany that now enjoyed the current account surplus, the 
proceeds of which it was now free to invest abroad. (See Figure 2 below.) 
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Figure 2: Current Account Payments ($ Billion) 
 
Source: OECD 
Accordingly, as was the case under the inter gold standard, the policies of economic 
adjustment adopted by both countries have been dictated by their respective balance of 
payments positions as deficitary or surplus states. Indeed, just as under the gold standard, 
the deflationary workings of EMU have turned into a much greater source of economic 
hardship and political contentiousness in the deficitary country (France compared to 
interwar Germany) than in the surplus country (Germany compared to interwar France) 
where longer than anywhere else, the elites and public alike have remained committed to 
the “sound money” ideals underpinning the euro.  
It is thus to examining these variable economic and political trajectories in both 
countries as they were informed by the interwar gold standard, and watching for the 
potential resonances these may present with their current trajectories, that we now turn. In 
so doing, we recall Polanyi’s insight that in the 1930s the deflationary policies required to 
defend the gold parity were ultimately socially and politically unsustainable, leading states 
to break with the gold standard and repudiate the self-regulating market system that it had 
underpinned. Both France and Germany would experience a sociopolitical backlash against 
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these policies, but the latter assumed different forms as a function of the distinct dynamics 
of sectoral and partisan conflict that deflation would provoke in both countries. 
 
The Politics of Deflation in France and Germany  
As was mentioned, in Germany currency stabilization and the return of the mark to gold in 
1924 initiated a cycle of capital inflows that would underpin the country’s economic 
revival.73 As a consequence, from 1924 to 1927 German industrial output rose by 50% and 
exports by 75%. GDP surpassed prewar levels by 20% and unemployment fell from a high 
of 24% in November 1923 to 6% three years later. And from 1922 to 1927, the German 
stock market quadrupled in value.74 The prosperity of the period was attested to by the 
dramatic expansion of social legislation, which lay the foundation for the most advanced 
welfare state the world had yet seen. Among the progressive—and costly—reforms passed 
under Weimar at this time were the compulsory arbitration of contract disputes; the 
introduction of relatively high industry-wide wage rates; the restoration of an eight hour 
workday in large firms; the expansion of occupational health and safety standards, and last 
but not least, the introduction of a comprehensive unemployment insurance program—the 
first of its kind in the industrial world.75 Finally, awash with surplus capital, Germany was 
able to service its reparations obligations and still have money left over to invest in its 
productive infrastructure, driving growth up until 1928. 
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 However, the country’s dependence on foreign capital inflows made the German 
economy highly vulnerable to capital flight, with the potential of plunging it into a grave 
balance of payments crisis. These imbalances were worsened by Germany’s reparations 
under the Dawes and Young Plans, which meant that the country was effectively already 
starting out with a substantial current account deficit before even accounting for the normal 
balance of payment asymmetries resulting from the gold standard’s natural operation. Most 
notably, these preliminary payment imbalances meant that the deflationary effect of the 
gold standard would need to be substantially magnified once the compensatory inflow of 
capital ceased. This in turn served to weaken the credibility of the peg of the mark to gold, 
with speculators betting that Germany would be unable to hold to it due to the increasingly 
onerous social and political costs associated with its defense. Thus, doubts about the gold 
peg ended up feeding a vicious circle whereby the more the government committed itself to 
defending the peg by introducing ever more onerous deflationary policies, the more foreign 
investors and speculators took this as a sign of waning credibility, thereby accelerating 
capital outflows and intensifying the balance of payment crisis.  
 At a second level, Germany’s precarious initial balance of payments position was 
worsened by the institutional mechanisms governing Germany’s adhesion to the gold 
standard, which blunted the Reichbank’s ability to alleviate pressure on the mark-to-gold 
peg by providing adequate reserves to defend it, while diminishing its capacity to lessen the 
deflationary effects implied by its sustention. Specifically, a provision under the 1924 bank 
law to arrest the hyperinflation effectively prohibited the Reichsbank from engaging in 
expansionary open market operations (and thus increase the money supply) to counter an 
economic downturn. Likewise, the same law stipulated the establishment of an inviolable 
40% gold cover ratio (i.e. that gold reserves would remain proportionate to 40% of the 
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money in circulation.) Finally, under the Dawes agreement, a 400 million mark ceiling was 
imposed on the amount of public debt the Reichsbank was allowed to discount.76 In short, 
the German central bank found itself strictly constrained in its ability to both defend the 
gold peg as well as offset its deflationary effects. 
 Finally, Germany’s balance of payment situation was worsened by the unhelpful 
role played by other actors in the system—notably France and the US—who, rather than 
playing by the rules of the gold standard, intervened in their own money markets by 
sterilizing gold inflows into their countries. As a result, they substantially neutered the 
factor of foreign demand that gold surplus countries are supposed to have on the system, 
the US doing so by raising interest rates in order to tame the US stock market bubble in 
1928, and the French by limiting the monetary expansion presumed by the inflow of gold 
through the sale of foreign exchange reserves to offset the money-creating effect of gold 
imports.77 
 Thus, once capital inflows into Germany began to reverse in 1928, the combination 
of these internal and external factors linked to the operation of the gold exchange standard 
rendered it ultimately unsustainable in Germany. At one level, this reversal reflected the 
“irrational exuberance” of the American stock market, provoking the expatriation of capital 
from Europe to the US. This capital outflow was further exacerbated by the restrictive 
monetary policy introduced in the US starting in 1928 in order to restrain speculation on 
Wall Street, with the resulting higher interest rate in America inviting capital from abroad 
in search of higher returns. In Germany, this resulted in a rapid fall in the level of foreign 
lending. The value of German bonds sold abroad fell from a quarterly average of 578 
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million marks between the third quarter of 1927 and the second quarter of 1928 to 114 
million and 273 million in the third and fourth quarters of 1928, and then 235 and only 75 
million in the first and second quarters of 1929.78 This drying up of lending to Germany 
precipitated a growing imbalance in the country’s national payments, with the Reichsbank 
forced to start committing reserves in defense of the gold peg.  
As a result, particularly following the suspension of the gold standard in commodity 
exporting countries hard hit by the global collapse in agricultural prices, Germany was 
forced to implement “drastic” monetary and fiscal retrenchment in order to try to stanch 
capital outflows and maintain the credibility of the mark-to-gold peg. The Reichsbank thus 
maintained a discount rate of 7% through 1928 (compared to central bank discount rates of 
3.5% in France, 4.5% in Britain, and 3.5% to 5% in the US) so that by the end of the year, 
the real monthly interest rate rose to 9%.79 Likewise, on the fiscal front, budget deficits run 
by state and local government, who saw their access to foreign lending much reduced, were 
closed through deep public spending cuts. However, the overall budget deficit continued to 
rise as a result of the rising costs of unemployment insurance and other social insurance 
programs as well as the decline in tax receipts due to the fall in economic output. Thus, 
from January 1928 to January 1929, the quantity of workers on unemployment benefits 
rose from 1.3 million to 1.9 million, with an additional 138,000 on “crisis relief.” 
Accordingly, the costs of social insurance more than doubled from 2,449 million marks in 
1925-1926 to 5,079 million in 1928-1929.80 
Finally, Germany’s economic situation was made all the more dire by the fact that, 
just as foreign lending was coming to a halt and Germany was already slipping into a 
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deflation-induced depression, the country’s foreign payments position was growing 
increasingly unsustainable on account of its reparations obligations. Under the Dawes Plan 
schedule, Germany was due to increase its payments to a full $625 million a year—i.e. 5% 
of GDP—starting in 1929.81 Disagreements with France over loan renegotiations further 
unsettled short-term investors in Germany, provoking a new spike in capital outflows that 
further worsened the country’s external balance. The Reichsbank now began to hemorrhage 
gold at an increasingly alarming clip, losing $100 million in just ten days in the first half of 
April 1929, compelling it to further raise the discount rate to 7.5%, despite the onset of 
recession.82 The Young Plan (August 1929), which reduced Germany’s reparations annuity 
from 2.5 billion marks to 2 billion and provided for a private bridge loan of 1.2 billion 
marks temporarily stabilized the situation. However, in order to raise the foreign exchange 
required to service this debt, the country was forced to further restrict spending, thereby 
shifting from trade equilibrium in 1929 to a trade surplus of 1.6 billion marks in 1930.83 A 
further round of monetary restrictions and spending cuts was imposed in order to maintain 
the confidence of foreign lenders and investors at the end of 1930, which marked the start 
of a three-year period over which 10 billion marks of German debt was scheduled to 
mature.84 
The economic and social costs associated with the deflationary policies pursued by 
successive German governments in order to preserve investor confidence and maintain 
Germany within the gold standard were severe. (See Figure 3 below.) 
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Figure 3: Unemployment in France and Germany in the Interwar Period 
 
Source: B. Eichengreen and T. Hatton, “Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective: An Overview,” 
in Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective (Dordecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1988), 6. 
 
In 1930 alone, industrial production fell by 25%, unemployment rose to 4.5 million, 
wholesale prices declined by 15% and consumer prices by 7%. Likewise, between 1928 
and 1930, the average real wages of industrial workers fell by 11% while, according to one 
estimate, the salaries of white-collar workers declined by 14%.85 Accordingly, the costs of 
unemployment insurance more than doubled from 1.2 billion marks in 1928 to 2.7 billion in 
1930, further straining the budget. The situation was aggravated by the lack of 
expansionary demand coming from countries with a gold surplus—i.e. France and the 
US—which in the face of the global economic slump, “limited [themselves] to intermittent 
foreign exchange market intervention.”86  
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 In turn, politically, the economic crisis and its social impact led to growing 
instability and polarization within the country, marking the onset of a process of democratic 
breakdown that would culminate with the accession of the Nazis to power in January 1933. 
This process unfolded in the face of the paralysis and passivity of the mainstream Weimar 
parties regarding how best to deal with the economic crisis, translating into an effective 
continuation of the policy of deflation—even beyond Germany’s de facto departure from 
gold in June 1931—that would fuel the Nazis’ rise. At root, the prolonging of deflation 
reflected the persistent commitment of these parties to gold and their refusal to embrace 
reflationary counter-cyclical spending as a solution to the crisis.  
 In turn, the Depression began to have distributional costs that upended the sectoral 
alliances that had underpinned the political coalitions attending Weimar since 1924. For 
example, the alliance of labor and exporting firms that had crystallized during the period of 
inflation and stabilization in 1923-1924 was torn asunder as the Depression’s impact was 
felt by both groups and the margins of business to accommodate the wage demands of labor 
evaporated.87 Likewise, the alliance between national producers and small savers and 
creditors that had emerged as a result of hyperinflation and the revaluation debate eroded as 
the former became increasingly receptive to loosening deflationary constraints to rekindle 
investment and consumer demand while petits rentiers, still traumatized by the memories 
of 1923, continued to cling to their “sound money” commitment to gold.88 Finally, 
agricultural interests, particularly small farmers, who had been devastated by the collapse 
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of global commodity prices and found themselves in increasingly desperate economic 
straights, felt increasingly abandoned by the mainstream parties as a whole.89 
 As a result of the passivity demonstrated by the latter in the face of the crisis and the 
shifting sectoral calculations that had cemented the mid-1920s coalitions that had overseen 
revaluation, a growing number of workers, middle class elements, and farmers rejected 
their traditional partisan attachments and opted for radical alternatives, presaging the 
political polarization that would pave the way to Nazi rule. Labor began to abandon the 
SPD or Catholic Zentrum (center) Party for the KPD or NSDAP (Nazi Party). Farmers 
decamped from the DNVP for extra-parliamentary agrarian movements and the NSDAP. 
And the middle classes, both “new” and “old,” turned their backs on the centrist liberal 
parties (DDP and DVP) for the NSDAP. Clearly, the greatest political benefactor of this 
process of sectoral political dis-identification was the Nazis, underscoring the deep 
disenchantment of these groups with the Weimar parties and particularly their inability or 
reluctance to address the causes of the Depression.  
 The political impacts of the Depression first came into the open with the collapse in 
March 1930 of the grand coalition government that had presided over the stabilization of 
the mark and ruled the country in one form or another since 1924. Specifically, the collapse 
of the SPD-led Heinrich Müller ministry followed the debate over the issue of whether to 
expand unemployment insurance, a measure supported by the SPD but rejected by the 
DDP/DVP. The ensuing minority government that was formed by Heinrich Brüning with 
DDP/DVP support proposed a swingeing deflationary program which sought to stabilize 
prices and wages while opposing government spending for public works and 
unemployment relief. Brüning’s attempt to invoke emergency powers in order to pass a 
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deflationary budget was defeated in the Reichstag in July 1930, leading to new elections in 
September. It was in these elections that the Nazis achieved their democratic breakthrough, 
winning 18.3% of the vote and 107 seats in the Reichstag (compared to only 2.6% and 12 
seats in the previous elections of 1928), while the KPD won 13.1% and 77 seats (versus 
10.6% and 54 parliamentary seats in 1928.) A testament to mounting political polarization 
in the country, the September 1930 election results panicked the financial markets, with 
half of the country’s gold reserves leaving the country.90 
 In the face of such polarization, the SPD agreed to support the new minority 
government formed by Brüning, supporting the conferral of emergency decree powers to 
him and thus consenting to the imposition of the very deflationary measures they had 
previously opposed. These included the restriction of unemployment benefits, a 20% 
reduction in the salaries of high federal and state officials, a 6% salary cut for lower level 
civil servants, increases in the income tax as well as in the excise taxes on certain goods, 
such as beer and tobacco, and the imposition of new levies on warehouses and mineral 
water.91 The cumulative effect of these measures was to deepen the Depression, their 
deflationary impact underscored by the fact that, despite the fall in state revenues as the 
economy contracted, expenditures had been cut to such an extent that the budget deficit still 
was halved from $200 million in 1929 to $100 billion in 1931, representing less than 1% of 
GDP.92 
 However, whatever calming effect these brutal economies had on foreign lenders 
and investors in Germany, the latter was shattered by the failure of the Credit Anstalt in 
Vienna in May 1931, which precipitated a wave of financial crises that rippled through 
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Austria, Hungary and then Germany. In the first three weeks of June, the country lost $350 
million in reserves.93 The pace of the outflows accelerated following the June 17 
bankruptcy of Norddeutsche Wolkkammerei, a large German textile conglomerate whose 
liabilities put at risk the solvency of Germany’s third largest bank, the Danatbank. Due to 
the reserve outflow, the Reichsbank could not bail out the Danatbank out without crossing 
the 40% reserve threshold written into its statutes. The only solution then became to secure 
a foreign loan to cover the country’s losses and restore liquidity and confidence to the 
crippled German financial system.  
As the scope of Germany’s obligations became apparent—the country had a 
reparations debt of $9 billion, foreign private liabilities of $6 billion, $3.5 of which was 
short-term lending that could be pulled out of the country at any moment, while its GDP 
had fallen from $16 billion in 1929 to $13 billion in 1930—it became obvious that it could 
not fulfill them, let alone service any new loan to tide it over despite the Allies agreeing to 
a one-year moratorium on reparations payments.94 Thus, with no international loan 
forthcoming, Germany was effectively forced to go off gold at the end of July 1931 when, 
in the face of its collapsing banking system, the Reichsbank suspended all payments on the 
country’s short-term debt and imposed exchange controls. The banking system’s collapse 
sent the economy hurtling further downward, an effect further magnified by Britain’s 
departure from gold in September 1931 which effectively froze Germany’s foreign trade. 
Thus, by the end of 1932, production had fallen by another 20%, with the industrial 
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production index decreasing to only 60% of the 1928 level. Unemployment rose to almost 
six million, representing over 40% of the labor force. (See Figure 3 above.)95 
One would have thought that these dire economic indicators, combined with the 
new macroeconomic freedom afforded by the effective abandonment of gold in September 
1931, would have prompted an economic policy shift on the part of the Brüning 
government toward reflationary spending in order to boost investment and stimulate 
demand. Such a shift was not forthcoming, however, as the government effectively doubled 
down on its deflationary course. Still obsessed with the fear of inflation and despite having 
no more gold reserves, Brüning decided to conduct Germany’s economic policy as if it still 
were on gold, “nailing it,” in the words of one observer, “to a sort of shadow standard and 
thereby foregoing the benefits of a cheap currency.”96 Persisting in this deflationary course, 
Brüning further reduced the amount and period of unemployment compensation in July 
1931 and again in the summer of 1932. Likewise, in December 1931, he decreed a 10% 
reduction in fixed prices and a 15% cut in wages, effectively bringing them back down to 
their level of January 1927 and eliminating at one fell swoop the gains that had been made 
by German labor in the interim.97  
By summer 1932, German unemployment had crossed the six million mark, 
representing a staggering 43.8% of the workforce.98 Overall, real net wages had fallen to 
64% of their prewar level.99 On the back of these catastrophic economic indicators, the 
country saw a continuing erosion of the liberal center and correlative rise of extremist 
parties, the NSDAP in the lead. In the July 1932 elections, the Nazis came first in a national 
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vote for the first time, winning 37.3% of the ballots cast and 230 seats, relegating the SPD 
to second place with 21.6% and 133 seats, the first time it had not come first in a national 
election since 1912. Meanwhile, the KPD came third with 14.3% of the vote and 89 seats. 
Attesting to the collapse of the liberal center, the three centrist parties—Zentrum, DDP and 
DVP—received less than 15% of the total vote. 
Initially, the new government formed by Franz von Papen refused to deviate from 
the deflationary line, despite the Allies abolishment of Germany’s reparations debt at the 
Lausanne Conference of July 1932. Rather, he continued where Brüning had left off, 
announcing wage cuts that ranged from 20% to 50% depending on the sector, a 23% cut in 
unemployment insurance, a 10% in “crisis” support, a 15% reduction in welfare assistance, 
followed by a 7.5% to 15% cut in disability benefits. By the same token, his government 
reduced the maximum period of eligibility for unemployment insurance to only six 
weeks.100 Once it became apparent that such measures were worsening the situation and 
fueling even more political polarization, von Papen reversed course by finally trying to 
reflate the economy with a 1.5 billion mark public works plan. And in November 1932, his 
successor, Kurt von Schleicher introduced a further reflationary package of 500 million 
marks in public spending to curb unemployment. However, by then it was too late. 
Although the Nazi vote fell somewhat from the July result in the November elections, the 
party still secured a plurality of 33.1% and won 196 seats, making Hitler an unavoidable 
interlocutor in forming the next government and paving the way to his nomination by von 
Hindenburg as chancellor in January 1933. 
The question must be: why did the parties of the liberal center under Weimar persist 
in their deflationary policies given their insupportable social and political costs? For the 
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pro-business and petit rentier-based liberal governments of Brüning and von Papen, the 
answer is relatively straightforward. Haunted by the memories of hyperinflation that had 
ruined their middle class saver constituents, these leaders wished to preempt any possibility 
of a repeat of such an episode. Thus, they persevered in maintaining and respecting the 
ethos of the gold standard despite no longer being tied to gold, thereby foreswearing the 
autonomy to engage in the demand and investment boosting countercyclical spending 
policies which going off the gold standard had afforded them. Similarly, both leaders 
believed that budget cuts would reassure foreign investors, thereby attracting capital which 
would in turn enable economic recovery.101 
As regards the SPD, the answer is more complicated, presenting a mix of strategic 
and ideological motives. Strategically, following the Nazis electoral breakthrough in the 
September 1930 elections, the SPD felt compelled to support Brüning’s minority 
government in order to block the political ascension of the NSDAP. Accordingly, it ignored 
the imperative of acting in the workers’ economic interests by supporting a center-right 
ministry that it had previously opposed over the issue of expanding unemployment benefits, 
the issue which had brought down the SPD/DDP/DVP coalition in 1930. As Peter 
Gourevitch observed, the SPD was caught in an increasing tight vice between defending the 
interests of its working class constituency and its commitment to constitutionalism. In the 
end, it thus opted “to support a pro-system government even when that government pursued 
economic policies contrary to social democratic goals.”102 
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However, it could also be argued that the SPD’s effective continued commitment to 
deflation also proceeded from ideological motives. Reflecting the orthodox Marxist outlook 
of the SPD’s chief economic theorist Rudolf Hilferding, the party clung to the deterministic 
argument that the Depression represented a fundamental crisis of capitalism, which was 
bound to precipitate the final collapse of the latter and herald the onset of socialism. As 
such, the party leadership called for allowing the business cycle to run its course rather than 
throwing the capitalist system a lifeline by introducing reflationary policies that would 
dampen the “class contradictions” at its heart. Following this logic, Hilferding and his allies 
argued against an “offensive economic policy” because in the final analysis social and 
political outcomes were to be decided by “the logic of capitalism.”103 
Conversely, a growing fraction of SPD members, primarily those closest to the 
labor movement, rejected this attentiste position. They argued that not only would letting 
the Depression run its course end up economically worsening the plight of the workers 
whose interests the SPD claimed to defend, but that this course would also prove politically 
disastrous for the party as workers electorally migrated to other parties that called for 
actively defending the interests of the latter through the institution of reflationary policies 
to improve their socioeconomic conditions. Instead, they maintained, the party needed to 
discard its doctrinaire faith in the “mystical power of the market” and accept that the sole 
way out of Depression—and of stopping the hemorrhaging of worker support from the 
SPD—was through intervention in the market.  
These doctrinal differences between orthodox and revisionist socialists came out 
into the open in a debate surrounding the so-called WTB (Woytinsky—Tarnow—Baade) 
Plan that the trade union movement had drawn up in order to fight against the generalized 
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unemployment afflicting their ranks. In essence, the plan represented a proto-Keynesian job 
creation proposal which called for a combination of proactive state policies to be financed 
through deficit spending in order to stimulate the economy and restart the cycle of 
investment. It called for two billion marks to be spent by the state to finance a public works 
program that would serve to reabsorb the unemployed into the workforce.104 At a “crisis” 
summit convened in April 1932, the orthodox wing of the SPD opposed the WTB Plan, 
positing instead that the time was ripe to establish the foundation for a fully socialist 
planned economy. Accordingly, Hilferding and his followers unveiled their own 
counterproposal which respectively called for centralized economic planning; nationalizing 
of banks, insurance and other strategic sectors; takeover of monopolies by the state; 
expropriating large estates; shortening the workweek and introducing a limited work-
sharing program to be financed through higher taxes and a compulsory loan issue.105 Due to 
the influence of the orthodox faction within the party leadership, the latter plan was adopted 
despite the practical and political unrealism of these proposals.106 As one observer acidly 
quipped, by dint of its doctrinaire orthodox Marxism the SPD had proved itself 
“intellectually Marxist but programmatically Ricardian.”107 Thus, in the crucial election of 
July 1930, the SPD effectively helped prepare the way for the Nazi electoral breakthrough 
as disillusioned workers deserted the party in droves for more programmatically appealing 
alternatives. 
At the same time, in the face of the SPD’s inaction, the NSDAP was able to forge its 
own success by evolving a forceful policy platform that was explicitly designed to address 
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worker grievances. Attacking both the deflationary policies of the Brüning government and 
the political attentisme of the SPD, the economic programs outlined by the party in 
preparation of the 1930 and 1932 elections partly incorporated proto-Keynesian ideas. 
Thus, in its Employment Program of October 1930, the party placed, in the words of one 
scholar of Nazism, “great emphasis on job creation and commitment to a major scheme of 
public and related works to soak up the unemployed.”108 In order to do the latter, the 
NSDAP called for introducing one year of compulsory labor service for all unemployed 
men of working age, amending the constitution to guarantee employment by the state, and 
launching a public works program financed through the creation of a state-controlled 
building and loan association. At a time when Brüning and the parties of government, 
including the SPD, were still subordinating the imperative of economic recovery to 
servicing reparations, the NSDAP was the sole party calling for proto-Keynesian 
inflationary spending and job creation in order to combat the recession.109 Indisputably, the 
program laid the basis for the party’s electoral breakout in the September 1930 elections, 
just as the Depression was beginning to cruelly bite in Germany. 
Such countercyclical spending policies to combat unemployment were further 
perfected in the Nazis’ Immediate Economic Program (Wirschaftslische Sofortprogramm) 
that was unveiled prior to the July 1932 elections. Reminiscent of the WTB Plan that had 
been rejected by the SPD leadership, these policies included funding a public works 
program that envisioned mass-scale housing and highway construction, the establishment 
of new agricultural settlements, and land improvement and conservation. Calculated to cost 
ten billion marks, the program was designed to provide jobs to some two million workers, 
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one million of them in the housing sector alone. Correlatively, in true Keynesian fashion, 
the Nazis argued that the program would end up paying for itself and saving money for the 
state by lowering of unemployment insurance expenditures and greater tax revenues. In 
turn, resurrecting an article from the party’s 1930 program, the Immediate Program also 
commissioned the establishment of a national credit institution by the Reichsbank to 
finance these public works. Finally, the program called for relaxing monetary rigueur and 
instead expanding the money supply in order to make credit available at low rates of 
interest and thereby stimulate private investment.110  
However, where the Immediate Economic Program went perhaps further than the 
WTB Plan was in its unequivocal call for Germany to abandon the gold peg, which was 
portrayed in May 1932 by chief Nazi party economic theorist, Gregor Strasser, as “a 
degenerate theory of economics [that] demand[ed] that… the state… break with the demon 
of gold [and] the world economy.” Instead, Strasser called for adopting “a new kind of 
economic thinking and new attitude towards the state” whereby the latter could “use [its] 
money for work creation and… productive credit creation (i.e. deficit spending…)”111 In 
true Keynesian fashion, the Nazis had come to grasp that the external constraint imposed by 
the gold peg would render their reflationary program mute. Hence their full-throated 
advocacy of its abandonment by Germany as a precondition for successfully implementing 
the latter. And once again, in the face of the sustained commitment to deflation on the part 
of the parties of the center and of the right, and the orthodox Marxist-inspired passivity of 
the SPD and KPD, the NSDAP emerged as the only party which offered a reflationary 
economic program which sought to combat the Depression and address the plight of 
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Germany’s six million unemployed in the here and now. Thus was it able to win a plurality 
of the vote in the July and November 1932 elections, paving the way to Hitler’s accession 
to power. 
In turn, once it assumed power the Nazi Party acted to carry out its program. 
Though within a few short months it had effectively extirpated democracy within Germany, 
the party moved equally quickly to consolidate its legitimacy by seeking to overcome the 
Depression and lower unemployment. Proclaiming full employment to be the regime’s 
overriding goal and deploying slogans which affirmed “the right to work,” the Nazis 
embarked on a comprehensive proto-Keynesian countercyclical reflationary spending 
program the likes of which was unrivalled anywhere else in the industrial world. Launched 
under the supervision of freshly renamed Reichsbank president—and from June 1934, 
jointly appointed Minister of Economics—Hjalmar Schacht, the spearhead of this initiative 
was the Reinhardt Program of June 1933, a public works infrastructure program that 
financed investment in waterways, railroads, highways and housing construction.112 
Correspondingly, a series of supportive macroeconomic policies were put in place to 
stimulate private demand. These included restarting the flow of credit through deficit 
spending; lowering the discount rate; consolidating and securing government debt; 
improving state control over the banking system; and providing subsidies and tax relief to 
industry and businesses so as to encourage hiring and investment. Financed by a policy of 
deficit spending that was unprecedented in peacetime economies, the German national debt 
rose from 1.6 billion marks in 1933 to 30 billion in 1938.113  
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On the back of such a massive countercyclical deficitary spending and public works 
program, the unemployment situation improved almost immediately. The number of 
unemployed dropped from six million in January 1933 to 2.4 million by the end of 1934. 
By 1939, there were only 302,000 official unemployed in the country, representing by far 
the lowest rate in the industrial world.114 Not surprisingly, the country’s fantastic economic 
turnaround following the accession of Hitler to power became the foundation of the 
regime’s legitimacy during the pre-war years and arguably throughout the war as well.  
These countercyclical spending policies that were pursued by the Nazi regime were 
part of a greater project to subordinate the economy to the national weal (volk) and thus 
assert the social imperatives of the national community over the pursuit of individual self-
interest. In practice, this meant expanding the role of the state in the economy through the 
instrument of economic planning, particularly in strategic sectors such as armaments. Most 
industries came under government control, with industries grouped into state-supervised 
cartels. Agriculture was also cartelized and put under the supervision of the Reich Food 
Estate. Finally, small businesses needed to be approved and registered with a Chamber of 
Handicrafts.115  
In turn, the regime pursued the goal of maximizing the nation’s economic self-
sufficiency and thereby minimizing its dependence on outside partners. This was 
particularly the case in the area of foodstuffs and agricultural production, but also extended 
to strategic military sectors where the regime sought to implement a policy of import 
substitution. However, in order to avail itself of vital raw materials required to sustain 
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production in these strategic sectors, Nazi Germany entered into bilateral trade agreements 
with some 25 countries, primarily in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.116 
Thirdly, in the aim of sustaining production and growing the country’s 
infrastructure, the regime was not afraid to impose controls on the market to enhance 
productivity and channel resources from consumption to investment. Wages were tightly 
controlled with the imperative of full-employment being privileged over wage growth, with 
the added bonus that such a policy made more revenues available to business for 
investment.117 In turn, to ensure that profits were duly channeled to investments, in 1934 
the regime passed a law restricting dividend payouts to 6% of profits, with any surplus 
statutorily directed to the purchase of German treasury bonds. Last but not least, prices 
were controlled by political directive, partly in order to stabilize them but also as a means 
to direct investment to certain sectors rather than others.118 Thus, though the Nazis in power 
did not socialize the economy, they assumed tight control over its function in order to 
guarantee what they saw as the vital economic interests of the national community 
Finally, this national communitarian impetus driving Nazi economic policy before 
the war provided for the establishment of a broad-based welfare state, which incorporated 
and expanded many welfare policies that had first been instituted under Weimar. These 
included providing free access to higher education, offering child support to families, 
increasing retirement pensions and underwriting universal health insurance for all German 
citizens. Likewise, the regime provided a wide range of publicly subsidized entertainment 
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and leisure activities.119 And to pay for this expanded welfare state as well as the broader 
deficit spending implied by the regime’s countercyclical policy, the regime introduced a 
highly progressive tax system that favored ordinary Germans. Between 1936 and 
September 1939, corporate tax rates were raised from 20% to 40% to finance these new 
expenditures. Similarly, following Hitler’s dictum that in case of war “the higher incomes 
would be squeezed,” the costs of preparing for the war—and then of prosecuting it—were 
overwhelmingly borne by corporations and the wealthy rather than workers, peasants and 
the lower middle classes.120 
In short, by expanding the welfare state and introducing a progressive tax system, 
the Nazi regime considerably increased social equality and justice within Germany—
“undesirable” political and racial elements excluded—thereby offering ordinary Germans a 
greater degree of social mobility and opportunities for advancement than had been possible 
under either the Empire or Weimar. According to Götz Aly, Hitler’s policies: 
“…benefited around 95% of all Germans. They did not experience National 
Socialism as a system of tyranny and terror but rather as a regime of social 
warmth, a sort of ‘warm and fuzz’ dictatorship (wöhlfuhl-Diktatur). Social 
reforms… and real possibilities for social advancement, explain the regime’s 
rising or at least stable [levels of popular support.]”121 
 
 It is in the sense of this assertion of the prerogatives of national communitarian 
values in opposition to the deflationary policies pursued by Weimar that the Nazi regime 
came to represent, from a Polanyian perspective, the extremist or radical incarnation of the 
counter-movement of society against the attempt to impose a self-regulating market system 
on German society. In turn, that this counter-movement materialized in such a violently 
anti-democratic and totalitarian guise was in direct proportion to the brutal economic 
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privation and social dislocations that were suffered by the German people during the 
interwar period, chiefly as a result of the deflationary policies that were pursued in order to 
keep Germany tethered to the chief institutional embodiment of the free market, the gold 
standard. Thus, as Polanyi writes, the Nazi regime represented a radical “reform of the [the] 
market economy [that was] achieved at the price of the extirpation of all democratic 
institutions, both in the industrial and in the political realm.”122 
 
The French experience with deflation and depression in the 1930s was significantly 
different from that of Germany. There were two reasons for this, which are distinct yet 
related. First, it reflected the workings of the international gold standard and France’s 
specific position within it. At one level, the latter stemmed from the sizable balance of 
payment surplus and massive gold reserves which were accumulated by the country as a 
result of the undervalued franc. This surplus grew particularly large after Britain went off 
gold in September 1931, with the country nearly doubling its gold reserves from just above 
$1 billion in 1928 to nearly $2 billion by 1930 and then climbing to above $3 billion by 
1932. (See Figure 2 above.)  
In concrete terms, the resulting reserve cushion meant that France would not need to 
resort to deflation until much later than Germany. On the contrary, due to the magnitude of 
these reserve inflows, the country faced the opposite conundrum—how to prevent the gold 
influx from having an inflationary effect. Reflecting the economic and political elites’ 
commitment to a “sound money” philosophy, in 1928 the Bank of France adopted rules that 
explicitly forbade it from engaging in open market operations. This meant that the domestic 
money supply grew much less in proportion to the influx of gold than what was possible 
                                                            
122 The Great Transformation, 237. 
64 
 
under the 35% proportional cover limit, thereby limiting the liquidity enhancing function of 
the reserve inflows.123 
In related fashion, the Great Depression was to hit considerable later in France than 
in other countries. In the summer of 1930, when unemployment in Germany reached 4.5 
million and 2 million in Britain, in France there were only 190,000 unofficially 
unemployed workers.124 Under these conditions, the government saw no reason to adopt a 
reflationary policy. So long as foreign capital kept flowing in, interest rates remained low, 
and investment and consumption continued apace, while the stable franc minimized 
pressure to raise taxes or reduce public spending, it appeared that the country had hit on an 
optimal economic policy mix anchored by the franc Poincaré.125 Meanwhile, the lack of 
balance of payments pressures allowed France to embark on a substantial public works 
program—the National Retooling Plan—under the center right government of André 
Tardieu in October 1929.126  
However, by the beginning of 1932, the global economic downturn also began to 
catch up with France. That year, French GNP decreased by 7% and industrial production by 
13%.127 This depressionary contagion became increasingly strong as a growing number of 
countries left the gold standard, suddenly overvaluing the franc compared to the currency of 
other countries. In order to forestall this eventuality, France had imposed quotas on imports 
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of raw materials and foodstuffs in summer 1931 and these were substantially extended after 
Britain’s abandonment of gold in September 1931.128  
As a result of the fall in output and growth in protectionism, the French balance of 
payments surplus began to straighten. By early 1932 the external account remained 
balanced and France continued to accumulate gold, but only by liquidating its reserve 
currency reserves rather than due to a balance of payments surplus. This translated into an 
effective monetary contraction, which shrank the monetary base by five percent.129 In turn, 
the fall in government revenues due to the economic slowdown forced the national budget 
into deficit. The latter was seen as an inflationary threat by a French public and elites still 
conditioned by the memory of the inflationary spiral of the previous decade. These 
concerns over the state of the economy and state spending prompted investors to begin to 
pull out of France in anticipation of a looming budgetary and political crisis, so that by the 
end of 1932 the Bank of France began to lose reserves.  
Such investor concerns were in turn aggravated by political conflicts over the 
budget and uncertainty on how to close the deficit. The Cartel des gauches government that 
won back power in the elections of 1932 found itself irretrievably divided between the 
Socialist left and economically orthodox Radicals over where the burden for reducing the 
deficit should fall. Caught between these contradictory forces, the Herriot government 
attempted to redress the fiscal balance through a combination of modest tax increases and 
spending cuts, including a 5% reduction in civil servant salaries. Predictably, these 
expenditure cuts were vetoed by Socialist and left-leaning Radicals on the National 
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Assembly’s Finance Commission with the backing of striking government employees 
supported by the CGT. Meanwhile, the parties of the right, the Alliance Démocratique and 
Fédération Républicaine, in conjunction with conservative Radicals, were sufficiently 
powerful to block significant increases in wealth and income taxation. Caught in this 
parliamentary vice, the Herriot government lasted only six months before collapsing. 
Meanwhile, the budget was balanced by resorting to accounting gimmicks that would end 
up only fueling a new budget crisis the following year. 
The collapse of the Cartel des gauches inaugurated a period of gradual but ever 
tightening deflation that successive governments of both the center left and center right 
were to pursue over the following four years, until the advent of the Popular Front. This 
process, which was accompanied by a slow but inexorable decline of industrial production 
and employment, would be punctuated by a few periodic attempts to embark on reflationary 
policies in order to restart economic growth. However, as we shall see, these initiatives ran 
up against and were nullified by the external constraint imposed by the gold peg. And at the 
same time, as in Germany the uneven distributive impacts of these deflationary policies 
inevitably complicated their application, pitting different sectoral groups against each other 
in ways that heightened the political instability and polarization that were to punctuate the 
Third Republic’s final decade. 
The succeeding Daladier government was equally caught between the same 
pressures as its predecessor, pitting the contradictory demands of angry fonctionnaires 
protesting reductions in their pay, petits indépendants advocating spending and tax cuts, 
and financial interests who wanted to balance the budget on the backs of workers and the 
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middle classes.130 In winter and spring 1933, it proposed a series of measures to 
progressively reduce the deficit rather than attempt to eliminate it at one fell swoop. 
However, these economies were offset by the establishment of a minimum wheat price to 
address the growing protests in the countryside. Similarly, the law worked at cross-
purposes with deflation since it increased bread prices.131  
Like Herriot before him, the financial proposals put forward by Daladier were 
opposed on both the left and the right. On the one hand, any attempt to reduce government 
expenditures and hence slash fonctionnaire salaries rankled on the left as Socialists 
withdrew their support for the government. On the other, the right and conservative 
Radicals saw these proposals as fiscally irresponsible.132 The defeat in October 1933 of the 
budget that was proposed by the government for 1934 thus triggered its downfall, 
provoking renewed capital outflows and speculation against the franc. The fall of Daladier 
would trigger a cycle of parliamentary instability that, culminating in the Stavisky scandal 
and the riots of February 6, 1934, put an end to the period of Radical rule that had begun 
after the elections of 1932. The inability to agree on who should bear the burden of closing 
the budget deficit in order to preserve the gold peg grew into a source of political paralysis 
that allowed the nationalist extra-parliamentary right to gain ground. More broadly, this 
policy failure came to reflect a growing lack of public confidence in the ability of the 
Radical Party—the sole political formation probably capable of producing the fiscal 
compromise required to preserve financial stability—to govern.  
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By the same token, the fiscal impasse concentrated the minds of policymakers as the 
Bank of France lost 2.6 million francs of gold in the first two weeks of February alone.133 
The outflow reinforced the impression, particularly among foreigners, that after the US had 
devalued in April 1933 before stabilizing again at the lower real peg of $35 per ounce of 
gold in January 1934, France itself would be forced off gold as the country’s balance of 
payment deficits grew due to the now overvalued franc. Indeed, the American devaluation 
increased the price of French exports—and conversely reduced the price of French 
imports—from 25% to 30%, thereby substantially widening the French current account 
deficit.134  
However, the French political elite remained virtually unanimous, despite 
entertaining sharp differences on fiscal policy, on the need to defend the gold peg whatever 
the cost.135 The majority view continued to be that devaluation would ignite an explosion of 
inflation that would lead to an explosion in wage demands and a commensurate fall in 
investment. Accordingly, the February 1934 crisis and its economic fallout were considered 
sufficiently grave to install a government of national unity under former president Gustave 
Doumergue, whose first priority would be to tame the threat of inflation and thus maintain 
France at the helm of the gold bloc. In order to do this, the new government was granted 
emergency decree powers to raise taxes and reduce public spending. In April 1934, it 
employed these powers in order to impose 5% to 10% cuts on civil servants’ salaries and 
                                                            
133 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 356. 
134 Find ref. 
135 Only a handful of dissidents to this broad consensus, including the Radical Young Turks Bertrand de 
Jouvenel, Gaston Bergery and Georges Boris, the Socialist Deputies Marcel Déat, Adrien Marquet and 
Barthélemy Montagnon, the Independent politician Raymond Patenôtre, and the conservative Paul Reynaud, 
openly advocated for taking the franc off gold and to reflate the economy. See Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 
355, and Goodliffe, Resurgence of the Radical Right, 181. 
69 
 
3% cuts on war veterans’ pensions.136 This demonstration by the Doumergue government 
of its determination to remove the fiscal question from political debate proved reassuring to 
investors and French gold reserves rose by 10% from February to September 1934.137 
However, these deflationary policies aggravated the economic slump by imposing new 
burdens on wage earners and lower income groups.  
As a result of the failure to reverse the Depression, in November 1934 the 
Doumergue government was replaced by the more centrist ministry of Pierre-Etienne 
Flandin, which placed economic recovery at the top of its agenda. Arguing that deflation 
had run its course and that prices had fallen as low as they could go, the new government 
set about implementing a reflationary program to inject credit into the economy while 
removing price supports for wheat and authorizing the formation of provisional cartels by 
firms in order to help them overcome the crisis. In addition, the government also put in 
place measures to spread the burden of unemployment by encouraging a reduction of 
working hours and the suppression of overtime work.138 While the removal of the price 
floor for wheat ignited protests in the countryside and the cartel provision angered small 
business, it was the government’s loose credit policy that would ultimately prove its 
undoing. The new debt issued by the Flandin government to finance these initiatives ran up 
against the monetary constraint of the gold standard, making its reflationary policy 
unsustainable.139 
In turn, reflation worsened the country’s balance of payments position, provoking 
capital flight and depleting the country’s reserves, a trend that accelerated following 
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Belgium’s exit from the gold standard in March 1935. The Bank of France’s gold reserves 
fell by 2% in May 1935 and a further 11% in June. In response, the government was forced 
to increase the discount rate from 2.5% to 6% in order stanch capital outflows.140 This in 
turn squeezed out investment while worsening the budget deficit as debt-servicing costs 
rose, further aggravating the fiscal crisis. When Flandin attempted to reverse course and 
asked for decree powers to raise taxes and cut spending, these were denied by the Chamber, 
leading to the government’s fall. 
The experience of the Flandin Ministry underscored the futility of trying to pursue a 
policy of reflation from within the strictures of the gold standard. This failure highlighted a 
fundamental truth that policymakers in other countries had grasped—that devaluation was 
the necessary precondition in order for a government to be able to pursue a proactive 
spending policy to combat the Depression. French political leaders’ continued reluctance to 
admit this truth underscored how deeply they had internalized the commitment to “sound 
money” in the wake of the 1920s inflation crisis. 
The succeeding center right government of Pierre Laval was entrusted with 
resuming the deflationary course that had been temporarily abandoned by Flandin in order 
to maintain the gold peg. Armed with the emergency powers that had been denied his 
predecessor, Laval set about trying to balance the budget through the issuance of no less 
than 549 deflationary decrees. Their centerpiece was a 10% across-the-board expenditure 
reduction by the government, municipalities, colonial authorities and state concessions, 
including payouts on French Treasury notes. Combined with various tax increases, the 
government planned to reduce spending by 10.9 billion francs, 6 billion of it in government 
expenditures. In order to sweeten the deflationary pill, the government announced a 
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corresponding 10% reduction in the price of essential goods, such as gas, coal and 
electricity as well as noncommercial rents and mortgage payments.141  
Predictably, these measures were met with fierce resistance, particularly among 
civil servants. In the face of violent strikes that swept across the country, public servant 
salaries were in the end only reduced by 3% to 5%, thereby diluting the efficacy of the 
budget cuts.142 At the same time, Laval introduced certain offsetting price supports for 
wine, wheat and sugar, as well as launched his own public works plan, increasing defense 
spending, and intervening in the labor market in order to reduce employment.143 In short, 
by pursuing a grab-bag of budgetary retrenchment measures with protective policies that 
benefited certain sectors, Laval’s deflationary objectives were only partially met, 
representing only between a third and a half of the economies needed to balance the 
budget.144 In the face of the budget shortfall, the only available alternative was to lift the 
ceiling on Treasury notes the Bank of France could issue in order to obtain additional credit 
from the central bank. This effectively liberal monetary policy broke the back of Laval’s 
deflationary program, spurring an inflationary spiral that saw French prices surge by 17% 
between July 1935 and February 1936. This further exacerbated the country’s balance of 
payments imbalance as the value of exports fell and stabilizing capital inflows failed to 
materialize. Thus, in the year ending in March 1936, the Bank of France lost a full 20% of 
its gold reserve. To stem the outflow, the government was forced to raise the discount rate 
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from 3.5% to 5% though this ended up having little effect, the central bank losing a further 
9% of its reserves in April and May.145 
Meanwhile, the persistence of deflation linked to the operation of the gold standard 
was having concrete societal effects. From 1929 to 1936, unemployment quadrupled, with 
partial unemployment climbing even faster due to the shortening of working hours. The 
number of unemployed surged to two million—15% of the workforce—in 1935.146 
Meanwhile, groups hit hardest were peasants, who saw a 30% decline in the real value of 
their income, followed by shopkeepers and small business owners, who suffered an 18% 
decline. Protected by cartel arrangements, large-scale industry and its affiliated workers 
were somewhat protected and did not suffer as badly from the downturn as their 
counterparts in other industrial countries.147  
By this point, however, all groups were beginning to tire of deflation. Peasants 
wanted higher prices for their produce, the unemployed more generous relief payments, 
shopkeepers and artisans an end to falling prices that cut ever deeper into their bottom lines, 
and unions wanted higher wages for their members. In the face of its failure to either close 
the budget deficit or improve the economic situation, Laval’s government fell in January 
1936 as the Radical Party withdrew its support and joined with the PCF and SFIO in 
preparing a common program—the Popular Front—in preparation for the April 1936 
elections. 
The ensuing Popular Front government elected to once again embark on the path of 
reflation in order to overcome the Depression. However once again, its success would be 
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limited by the gold standard’s external constraint. Coming to power amidst a wave of sit-
down strikes on the part of workers demanding higher pay, shorter working hours and 
better working conditions, the new Blum government that was formed by a coalition of 
Socialist and Radicals with the parliamentary backing of Communists sought to restore 
economic growth by stimulating demand. The core of its economic program was a 20 
million franc public works plan, with three million earmarked for 1936 alone, which was to 
be financed through the discounting of Treasury notes by the Bank of France. Correlatively, 
credit was to be made available to by the Bank at a 3% rate of interest in order to stimulate 
private sector investment.148 Alongside such countercyclical spending initiatives, a number 
of social measures were introduced by the Blum government to boost demand by 
improving workers’ economic situation while attempting to lower unemployment through 
the encouragement of work sharing. The centerpiece of these social measures was the 
Matignon Accords, which granted trade unions official bargaining recognition, 
institutionalized collective bargaining within firms, and promulgated a 7% wage increase 
for skilled workers and a 15% for the unskilled. Likewise, under the Accords, the work 
week was shortened to forty hours without reductions in pay, and a five week annual paid 
vacation was instituted for all workers. Such measures were required in order to quell the 
widespread labor unrest that had accompanied the government’s arrival to power and in 
order to maintain Communist and Socialist support for the coalition. Finally, reflecting the 
influence of the latter, the arms industry was nationalized and a National Wheat Office 
established in order to regulate the distribution and support the price of wheat.149  
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As in the case of the Flandin government the year before, the economic 
effectiveness of these measures was significantly offset by the external gold constraint. The 
rise in production costs occasioned by the labor supporting measures enacted by the Blum 
government, along with the generation of credit through the Treasury bond issue, 
dramatically widened France’s balance of payments deficit. Similarly, since the country 
could not devalue to offset the competitivity loss occasioned by these measures due to the 
gold peg, the current account deficit ballooned, putting a huge strain on the country’s 
reserves and causing capital to flee the country and gold to drain from the Bank of France.  
By the end of the summer, capital outflows and speculative attacks against the franc had 
grown so unmanageable that on September 26, the Bank of France gave up trying to defend 
the gold peg, allowing the franc to devalue from 25% to 35% against the pound and the 
dollar under the Tripartite Agreement. At the same time, inflation began to surge, rising by 
4% in July and another 2% in August.150 
 However, despite devaluing the franc, the French economy failed to recover from 
the Depression. Real share prices fell by 10% between 1936 and 1937, while industrial 
growth was uneven at best. After rising at a quarterly rate of 2% between the fourth quarter 
of 1936 and the second quarter of 1937, production fell back down again and would not 
again reach the levels of third quarter 1936 until early 1938.151 By the same token, the 
French balance of payments position continued to deteriorate despite the devaluation. As a 
function of the worsening situation, the Blum government fell in July 1937. 
 This failure of devaluation to spur a recovery reflected a combination of two factors. 
First, the economy never recovered from the negative supply shock of the large cost 
                                                            
150 Goodliffe, Resurgence, 184, and Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 376. 
151 Ref. 
75 
 
increases that were imposed on firms as a result of the Matignon Accords, which 
represented an 18% to 20% nominal labor cost rise.152 Thus, though these measures did 
result in an expansion of demand, this was not met by a corresponding expansion of supply, 
thereby driving inflation rather than growth within the country.153 
 Secondly, the failure of the Popular Front’s policy also reflected the persistence of a 
‘gold ethos’ without a gold standard in France. Indeed, though the succeeding Chautemps 
and Daladier governments repealed many of the cost-raising measures that been introduced 
by Blum in the summer of 1936, the country’s balance of payments continued to 
deteriorate. This was in part because, alongside eliminating these measures, these post-
Popular Front governments also reverted to deflationary type by seeking to reduce inflation 
by cutting spending and trying to revitalize business confidence and capital investment 
through austerity measures. Testifying to this resilience of ‘sound money’ ideas among 
French policymakers, as Blyth has observed despite the fact that the “devaluation [did] 
create room for the economy to move, spending [failed to] pick up the slack… 
increase[ing] the import bill and deepen[ing] the slump.”154 Thus, it was only with the 
prospect of war and the launching of an armaments program to counter the rising threat of 
Nazi Germany that the French economy was finally able to pull out of the Depression but 
much later than the other industrialized countries. 
 France’s experience with deflation was thus very different from Germany’s. Having 
entered the Depression later and at a much softer angle than the generalized collapse of 
production that had hit Germany from 1929 to 1933, it was able to cling to deflation much 
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longer and, once the costs became too great, to (partially) wean itself from it without 
destroying its constitutional system of government. Conversely, however, France was to 
recover much more slowly and in more piecemeal fashion than Germany under Hitler, with 
ominous political-military implications for the future. By the same token, though France’s 
democratic political system remained intact throughout the period, it would be excessively 
sanguine to assert that the politics of deflation had left it unscathed. Indeed, starting in 1931 
and definitely by 1932, the political conflicts surrounding deflation—chiefly over who 
should bear its brunt—was a chronic source of ministerial instability that contributed to 
eroding the Third Republic’s legitimacy in the eyes of many Frenchmen. Likewise, the 
social divisions provoked by these conflicts, which came to a head in the riot of 6 February, 
1934, the public sector strikes of summer 1935, not to mention the general strike wave that 
paralyzed France in summer 1936, did much to weaken the regime and polarize the left and 
the right within it.155 In this sense, it seems implausible to deny that the deflationary 
policies pursued by governments of both the center left and center right during the 1930s 
helped to sow the diffidence and distrust of the Republic and its elites that would lead to the 
advent of Vichy only a short time later. 
 
Conclusion 
The politics of deflation as they respectively unfolded in France and Germany during the 
1930s affected the international role and stature of each country throughout the period. 
Germany, though its mainstream parties stuck to failed deflationary policies to the end until 
they were effectively overthrown, acted as a revisionist power. It notably sought to overturn 
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or modify the reparations regime that had come out of Versailles as the single most 
aggravating factor responsible for the country’s unsustainable balance of payments deficits. 
Indeed, this was the principal diplomatic objective pursued by successive Weimar 
governments through the Dawes and Young summits of 1924 and 1929 through the last-
ditch Lausanne conference of 1932. In turn, once the Nazis came to power, they universally 
repudiated Germany’s international economic obligations and eschewed the London 
Economic conference of 1933. Instead, Hitler set about revising the post-World War I 
European consensus, first through its remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, 
followed by the Anschluss in March 1938 and occupation of the Sudetenland in September 
of the same year.  
 Conversely, France was the status quo power par excellence over the interwar 
period. More than any other state, it sought to enforce the post-Versailles political status 
quo and graft the operation of the gold standard onto it. Thus, it proved the most reluctant 
of the Allied powers to agree to any revision of the reparations regime first set down at 
Versailles as proposed at the Dawes and Young conferences, with the Hoover Moratorium 
of June 1931, or even at the Lausanne Conference. To show that it meant business in 
enforcing reparations payments, it even occupied the Ruhr from January 1923 to August 
1925. In turn, it was the allied power that stuck longest to the interwar gold standard, 
serving as the core country of the rump gold bloc following the London Conference of June 
1933. Last but not least, in addition to their baleful domestic consequences, the deflationary 
policies the country continued to pursue in order to retain the gold peg necessarily meant 
that as war in Europe loomed, it would be the least militarily prepared to meet the German 
threat. While Germany had begun rearming in earnest in 1934, successive French 
governments slashed defense spending from 1934 to 1936 in pursuit of deflation. As a 
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result, according to one study, French defense spending between 1934 and 1938 was only 
one tenth the level of Germany’s.156 And as developments in the field a year later were to 
show, when France started to rearm in 1939, it would be too late. 
 Considering France and Germany’s international position in the 1930s, one cannot 
but be struck by the similarities that one can be drawn between them and the two countries 
that they have become today. They present mirror images of one another, with France today 
playing the (potential) role of revisionist power in Europe today, while Germany, as the 
France of yesteryear, filling the role of the status quo power. These similarities are 
especially striking with respect to the policies they propose in the area of economic 
governance. On the one hand, just as interwar France was the staunch philosophical and 
political defender of the gold standard, contemporary Germany emerges as the guarantor of 
the euro and enforcer of the “ordo-liberal” principles that underpin it. Under this 
dispensation, the Bundesbank-inspired ECB plays the same role within Europe that the 
Bank of France played under the gold standard and then the post-1933 gold bloc, serving as 
both the institutional embodiment and policy agent of “sound money” ideas that sees in 
deflation not only a corrective economic mechanism, but a normative agent of monetary 
virtue and discipline. 
In turn, the structural economic and social conditions accompanying France and 
Germany’s contemporary policy roles uncannily reflect those conditions that obtained 
within their policy analogue during the 1930s. Today, it is France that presents the largest 
balance of payments imbalance, while Germany, like 1930s France, the greatest surplus. 
(See Figure 2 above.) Likewise, as we saw, in part as a result of the deflationary measures it 
has been forced to adopt in order to address its balance of payments imbalances and meet 
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the ordo-liberal requirements of the EMU, France presents much higher levels of 
unemployment today than Germany—the converse relationship from the late 1920s, early 
1930s. (See Figure 4 below vs. Figure 3 above.) 
Figure 4: Unemployment in France and Germany (1990-2014) 
 
 In turn, politically, it is contemporary France, as the member state spokesman for 
Southern Europe within the EU, which fulfills the revisionist role that was played by 
Weimar Germany during the interwar ear. As in the case of the latter, though its governing 
elites continue to subscribe to the deflationary terms of membership in EMU, contemporary 
France, like 1930s Germany, represents the largest Eurozone economy in which the sound 
money or ordo-liberal ethos underlying the euro has been brought most comprehensively 
into question. Since the establishment of the Single Market in the late 1980s and launch of 
EMU in the early ‘90s, strong anti-system parties have emerged in the form of the Front 
National (FN) on the far right and the Parti de Gauche (and its predecessors) on the far left 
that question the current “German” governance of the euro and the acquiescence of 
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successive French governments to it. Indeed, in the 2002 and 2012 presidential elections, 
such anti-system Eurosceptical parties respectively won the favor of around four in ten and 
one in three voters in the first round, testifying to the fact that, just as in Germany in 1930, 
there is a broad and growing electoral constituency, concentrated mainly among the 
industrial and service working classes, who are opposed to Europe’s current course of 
economic governance. Most recently, this upsurge in Euroscepticism was to be seen in the 
victory of the FN in the May 2014 European parliamentary election, the first time that a 
party of the extreme right has come first in a national election in the history of the Fifth 
Republic. In short, politically, present-day France has seen a greater level of partisan 
fragmentation and polarization as a result of the socioeconomic impacts of deflation than 
Germany. (See Figure 4 below.) 
Figure 4: Political Fragmentation in France and Germany 
(1980-2013)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1981 1988 1995 2002 2007 2012
Vote for anti-system parties in France in Presidential 
Elections (1981-2012)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013
Vote for anti-system parties in (West) Germany in 
Federal Elections (1980-2013)
 
This is in direct contrast to the 1930s, where it was in Germany that we saw the greatest 
party fragmentation and polarization. (See Table 1 below.) 
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 In effect, it appears that, accounting for the very different historical contexts, the 
same logic of liberalization and counter-liberalization under the aegis of the gold standard 
that was analyzed by Karl Polanyi can also be seen at work within the contemporary EU 
under the auspices of the single currency. The electoral victory in January 2015 of the 
radical left-wing Syriza party in Greece on a reflationary platform, let alone the rise of anti-
austerity populist parties of the far left and far right throughout the continent appears to 
testify to the historical durability of this phenomenon. In this sense, the experience of the 
1930s provides valuable lessons for the present, notably that in times of recession the social 
costs of deflation become unsustainable and that rather than laying the basis for future 
growth, persisting in such a policy is instead likely to sow the seeds of political extremism 
and potentially antidemocratic outcomes.  
 
